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Congressional Leadership 1965–96: A New Look at the Extremism versus Centrality Debate

An examination of the differences between the ideological positions of leaders and other members in the U.S. House of Representatives (1965–96) demonstrates that Republican leaders tend to be significantly to the right of the median Republican member and Democratic leaders tend to be significantly to the left of the median Democratic member. Furthermore, leaders from both parties tend to be ideologically located near the mode of their party's ideological distribution. These empirical results have implications for issues such as party polarization, conditional party government, and the possibility of separating out party and ideology.

Consider a political party or other group electing one or more representatives from among its own members, as a party does when selecting its party leader(s). What characteristics might those representatives share? One body of comparative politics literature suggests that, for groups in which ideology is important, leaders will be more extreme than their followers (May 1973). But other authors have cast doubt on that claim (see e.g., Narud and Skare 1999; Norris 1995; cf. Dalton 1985). Specifically, the logic of the Black median voter theorem (Black 1958) suggests that if a single representative is to be chosen, and if voter preferences can be regarded as essentially one dimensional, then, *ceteris paribus*, the representative will be ideologically centrist relative to the other group members, since we would expect the *median* representative to be chosen.

For the U.S. Congress, past research has offered these two main hypotheses with regard to party leadership characteristics: one following the logic of the median voter theorem, the other upholding

the notion of extremist leadership selection in the comparative politics literature.¹ Perhaps the most common view is the “middleman theory” of party leadership, which asserts that party leaders will come from the (ideological) center of their respective parties (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 52–53; Peabody 1967; Truman 1959). In direct contrast, the extremist theory of party leadership contends that leaders of each party will be chosen from the end of the ideological spectrum where party strength is concentrated (MacRae 1958).²

Clausen and Wilcox (1987) offer an important variant of the extremist theory of leader selection—the policy partisanship theory of legislative selection. They argue that leaders are chosen to “prosecute a position representing a dominant segment of the party. Consequently, leaders and leader aspirants will occupy policy positions away from the party center in the direction of the partisan position” (1987, 244). A key idea of the policy partisanship theory is that, within each party, the ideological distribution is likely to be skewed (the mean will not equal the median); in this case, the median will be nearer to the heavier concentration of members. The area beyond the median, therefore, reflects the location of a concentrated set of members with similar ideological beliefs. The policy partisanship theory contends that leaders will be chosen from this concentration, on the opposite side of the median from the mean, because this is the center of the concentrated members who are in ideological agreement (Clausen and Wilcox 1987, 248). For unimodal distributions, we take the policy partisanship theory to imply that the mode, not the median, is the best predictor of the likely ideological location of a given party’s leadership.

An alternative explanation for why one gets results distant from the median and near the mode when studying leaders’ policy positions appears in our previous works (McGann 1997, 1999, 2002; McGann, Koetzle, and Grofman 2002a, b). We argue that there are key elements missing from the previous literature on leadership selection, namely, attention to the actual voting mechanisms by which nonmedian results might be achieved and to the nominating processes and factional structures of the parties that help determine which candidates will contest for leadership positions. In particular, we suggest that House leadership selection results appear close to party modes because (1) both parties use a sequential elimination majority rule voting (MRSE) process for the selection of House leaders,³ (2) there is a skewed distribution of House party members’ ideological preferences for both Democrats and Republicans, and (3) there exist factions internal to each party that provide support bases for the principal leadership contestants.⁴

McGann (1997, 2002) provides a model of party factionalization in which the factions located near the mode will generally be larger in size.⁵ When the ideological distributions within each party are asymmetric, then the median and the mode do not coincide. Moreover, in the McGann model, the candidate of the faction located nearest the Democratic mode is apt to be to the left of the party's median, and the candidate of the faction located nearest the Republican mode is apt to be to the right of the party's median. Thus, if each faction within a party nominates a member of their own faction (say one at the faction median) in an MRSE election, then the candidate of the faction closest to the mode can be expected to do better, on average, than candidates of other factions, and (given skewed distributions) that candidate will be located away from the median in the direction of the party mode.⁶ In previous studies (McGann, Koetzle, and Grofman 2002a, b), we have offered simulation results in support of this proposition.

Past research investigating these centrist versus extremist predictions about U.S. congressional leaders have elicited mixed results. Sullivan (1975), for example, found that congressional party leaders (1955–72) tended to be chosen from a wide ideological range, excluding, however, the most extreme. Likewise, Sinclair (1983) found that Democratic House leaders tended to be ideologically diverse. In the Senate (post-war period), Democrats tended to choose leaders from a center-left cluster that dominated the party for the 30-year period under analysis. Senate Republicans, on the other hand, did not recruit leaders from any particular ideological cluster. Patterson (1963) found that the ideology of party leaders did not tend to conform to either theory.

More recent research finds similarly mixed results. Polser and Rhodes (1997) examine the preselection behavior of House Speakers, majority and minority leaders, and majority and minority whips for the period 1875–1987. Employing a measure of party fidelity,⁷ Polser and Rhodes demonstrate that House Republicans tend to select leaders whose pre-election behavior signals their consistent location within the ideological core (median) of their party, thus providing strong support for the middleman hypothesis. Yet their analysis also shows that Democrats tend to select leaders whose pre-election behavior has signaled a willingness to increase the ideological differences between the two parties (Polser and Rhodes 1997). Clausen and Wilcox provide some empirical support for their theory of policy extremism (1987) for leaders of both parties.⁸ We will discuss their findings more fully in the following section.

Ideological Characteristics of Party Leaders and Party Members in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1965–96

In this section, using data from the U.S. House of Representatives for the period 1965–96, we examine leadership selection in the U.S. House in light of the Clausen and Wilcox policy partisanship theory (1987) and the McGann, Koetzle, and Grofman modeling and simulation work on the power of the modal voter (McGann 1997, 1999, 2002; McGann, Koetzle, and Grofman 2002a, b).

Hypothesis: Party leaders in the U.S. House should be located away from the party medians of their respective parties, in the direction of the mode.


Our data analysis differs from the Clausen and Wilcox (1987) analysis in several key respects.

First, the Clausen and Wilcox analysis extends only to 1978, but our analysis uses data from the period 1965–96. Our data are thus primarily from the post-reform era of Congress—an era that, on the one hand, saw increasing floor amendment behavior, which made passing legislation more difficult (Sinclair 1992; Smith 1989) and, on the other hand, saw the granting of new resources to leaders (especially through the use of restrictive rules) to overcome these difficulties (Sinclair 1992, 1995). In the post-reform era of Congress, who the party leaders are ideologically may be even more important than in previous periods.

Second, our analysis is expanded over that of Clausen and Wilcox (1987) to reflect the dramatic change in party leadership structure that occurred after the 1970s. As a result of a “strategy of inclusion” (Sinclair 1995), the number of members who serve in leadership positions has dramatically increased since 1978.⁹ Clausen and Wilcox (1987) examined only floor leaders and whips (as did the 1997 Polser and Rhodes study), but our analysis includes other party leaders, such as deputy leaders, regional whips, and at-large whips.

Third, our analysis employs two measures of ideology, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores and American Conservative Union (ACU) scores, instead of the multidimensional, policy-specific approach used by Clausen and Wilcox (1987). Because members cannot choose party leaders each time a new issue arises, we believe that, under the policy partisanship theory, party leaders should come from a concentrated faction whose ideological consanguinity reflects the major ideological differences between the parties.¹⁰ The vast majority of floor votes in the House fall along a single left-right

FIGURE 1
Kernel Density Plots of
Democratic House Adjusted ADA Scores, 1965–96
and Republican House ACU Scores, 1971–96




continuum (Poole and Daniels 1985; Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 1985, 1997)—a continuum that ADA and ACU scores tap.¹¹ In order to correct for the fact that interest groups use different sets of votes each year, thus possibly shifting and stretching the underlying scale in ways that can cause problems for analysis across time, Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) provide a way to “index” the ADA or ACU scores over time, and we make use of their adjustment method here.¹²

We may begin to view the ideological positions by looking at the smoothed kernel densities of party ideological distributions to identify both modes and medians of the party distributions.¹³ In Figure 1, we show such kernel density functions (smoothed histograms) for the adjusted ADA scores of House Democrats (1965–96) and for the adjusted ACU scores of House Republicans (1971–96).

Note that both distributions are strongly skewed. We see from Figure 1 that the Republican members have a modal ACU score of about 89 and the Democratic members have a modal ADA score around 85. In the case of the Democrats, the mode is considerably to the left

FIGURE 2
Kernel Density Plots of
House Party Members and Leaders:
Adjusted ADA Scores, 1965–96



of the median (Democrat median ADA score = 70), and for the Republicans, the mode is considerably to the right of it (Republican median ACU score = 78). On average, leaders in both parties are distant from the median in the direction of their party's modal concentration of members. The distance, however, is not as extreme as it could be. For neither Republicans nor Democrats are the leader positions as extreme as those of the modal members of the party.

We believe it best to use ACU scores for Republicans, to allow for comparisons over the whole time period 1965–96 and to allow for direct comparisons of the distributions of roll-call voting scores of members and leaders. Nevertheless, in Figure 2, we show the kernel densities of the adjusted ADA scores for Democratic and Republican members in the same graph as the adjusted ADA scores for party leaders in each party. The leadership distributions exhibit the same kind of skewness as for the parties as wholes, i.e., the *modal* Democratic party leader is to the left of the *median* Democrat leader, and the *modal*

Republican party leader is to the right of the *median* Republican leader. As a consequence, the *modal party leader* in each party is more extreme than even the *modal member* of that party. From this figure, it is possible to ascertain once again that the modal party leader in each party is more extreme than the modal party member, who is more extreme than the median party leader, who is more extreme than the median party member.

Table 1 presents the mean and median (adjusted) ADA scores for all Democrats, as well as the median (adjusted) ADA scores for Democratic party leaders for each year for the period 1965–96. Data is also provided for median (adjusted) ADA scores for nonregional party leaders.¹⁴ This table demonstrates that the general features illustrated in the pooled data in Figures 1 and 2 largely apply throughout the period. In every year but one (1969), the median Democratic (adjusted) ADA score is to the left of the mean Democratic (adjusted) ADA score.

Our hypothesis is that party leaders should be located in the part of the distribution away from the mean and beyond the median. In the case of Democrats, this hypothesis means that Democratic party leaders should be to the left of the median Democratic ADA score for any given year. The data in Table 1 generally support our expectations. For all Democratic leaders, only those in 8 years out of 30 run counter to our hypothesis.¹⁵ In 15 of the 30 years, the median ADA score for Democratic leaders is to the left of the median ADA score for all Democrats.¹⁶ In 22 of the 30 years, this value is to the left or equal to the median. In every year since 1984, the median Democrat leader has been ideologically identical to, or to the left of, the median Democrat. Considering only nonregional leaders provides even stronger support for the hypothesis under investigation. Here, in only 3 of 30 years is the hypothesis clearly not supported. In 20 of the 30 years, these leaders have median ADA scores well to the left of the median ideology of all Democratic members. Finally, considering only the floor leader and whip of the Democratic party,¹⁷ in only 9 of 30 years is the median of their two scores not to the left of the median score for all Democrats.¹⁸

Table 2 presents the same data for the Republicans (now using ACU scores) for the period 1971–96. In every year, the median ACU score for Republicans is to the right of the mean ACU score. We also expect that Republican party leaders should be ideologically to the right of the median Republican member. Once again, our expectations are generally confirmed. In 17 years, the median ACU score of Republican leaders is to the right of the median score for all Republicans, and in 3 years, it is identical to the median for all Republicans;

TABLE 1
Adjusted ADA Scores of U.S. House Democrats, 1965–96

Year	All Democrats		Democrat Leaders	
	Mean ADA (n)	Median ADA	All Leaders Median ADA	Nonregional Leaders Median ADA
1965	56.7 (289)	65.0	67.4 (4)	67.4 (4)
1966	56.3 (289)	68.0	77.0 (4)	77.0 (4)
1967	55.7 (243)	66.6	72.2 (22)	72.2 (5)
1968	55.3 (241)	65.0	65.0 (22)	72.0 (5)
1969	53.9 (236)	51.7	45.0 (21)	45.0 (5)
1970	52.8 (233)	57.5	49.4 (21)	53.5 (5)
1971	55.7 (252)	61.8	n/a	n/a
1972	55.2 (252)	57.3	n/a	n/a
1973	59.8 (240)	65.3	63.3 (28)	65.3 (8)
1974	55.8 (240)	57.4	58.0 (28)	71.8 (8)
1975	62.2 (285)	73.3	67.7 (29)	83.0 (8)
1976	63.0 (285)	68.4	63.2 (29)	76.2 (8)
1977	60.3 (285)	64.3	56.1 (38)	56.1 (18)
1978	60.0 (285)	57.5	60.7 (38)	69.2 (18)
1979	59.4 (269)	66.2	60.9 (39)	66.2 (17)
1980	56.7 (269)	61.0	56.0 (39)	67.0 (17)
1981	63.1 (234)	69.8	75.0 (45)	59.4 (23)
1982	62.5 (234)	70.3	70.3 (45)	70.3 (23)

(continued on next page)

TABLE 1
(continued)

Year	All Democrats		Democrat Leaders	
	Mean ADA (n)	Median ADA	All Leaders Median ADA	Nonregional Leaders Median ADA
1983	68.4 (259)	75.7	75.7 (52)	75.7 (29)
1984	65.6 (260)	71.8	74.3 (51)	74.3 (29)
1985	67.9 (243)	70.8	76.0 (65)	70.8 (42)
1986	67.2 (242)	73.6	73.6 (65)	76.0 (42)
1987	69.5 (248)	74.0	77.8 (79)	77.8 (57)
1988	68.9 (246)	73.4	78.5 (79)	83.6 (57)
1989	69.0 (247)	75.6	80.4 (97)	80.4 (79)
1990	68.0 (256)	75.9	81.0 (99)	81.0 (81)
1991	68.0 (264)	71.6	81.7 (104)	79.2 (86)
1992	70.7 (265)	74.9	80.0 (104)	80.0 (86)
1993	72.1 (256)	77.4	87.1 (94)	87.1 (76)
1994	71.8 (257)	76.4	81.4 (94)	81.4 (76)
1995	75.9 (203)	83.0	83.0 (86)	83.0 (86)
1996	74.4 (205)	81.0	81.0 (87)	81.0 (63)

Note: Values in cells represent indexed ADA scores (using the Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999 correction method) for House Democrats for the period 1965–96. Indexed ADA scores are used instead of “nominal” scores to control for the selection of different sets of votes each year by the ADA, which can lead to the distortion of the underlying scale over time. Scores are broken down by all Democrats, Democrat leaders (floor leaders, conference chairs, and whips), and by nonregional leaders (i.e., regional whips removed). Source for party leaders: *CQ Almanac* (1965–96). Source for ADA scores: *Americans for Democratic Action*.

TABLE 2
Adjusted ACU Scores of U.S. House Republicans, 1971–96

Year	All Republicans		Republican Leaders	
	Mean ACU	Median ACU	All Leaders Median ACU	Nonregional Leaders Median ACU
1971	60.4 (177)	68.2	67.8 (4)	67.8 (4)
1972	61.3 (178)	67.1	67.2 (3)	67.2 (3)
1973	62.3 (183)	67.6	65.0 (20)	65.0 (4)
1974	60.6 (183)	62.9	68.2 (19)	81.9 (3)
1975	66.2 (132)	74.4	75.8 (21)	77.1 (6)
1976	65.8 (140)	72.3	74.0 (21)	77.0 (6)
1977	67.2 (123)	72.1	75.2 (16)	77.3 (5)
1978	68.6 (134)	73.9	77.5 (20)	80.6 (4)
1979	71.6 (146)	77.0	76.6 (21)	75.7 (6)
1980	69.1 (155)	73.0	71.0 (23)	84.0 (7)
1981	74.8 (187)	77.5	77.5 (25)	74.8 (6)
1982	69.6 (191)	74.8	79.9 (26)	79.5 (7)
1983	71.1 (161)	77.1	75.5 (27)	80.4 (6)
1984	72.1 (165)	79.1	82.2 (28)	84.2 (7)
1985	72.5 (179)	78.1	79.0 (29)	85.5 (8)
1986	73.4 (179)	79.6	78.7 (28)	84.1 (8)
1987	76.2 (175)	83.2	83.2 (30)	86.6 (11)
1988	75.1 (176)	83.6	85.2 (31)	80.3 (10)

(continued on next page)

TABLE 2
(continued)

Year	All Republicans		Republican Leaders	
	Mean ACU (N)	Median ACU	All Leaders Median ACU	Nonregional Leaders Median ACU
1989	74.0 (174)	79.2	82.5 (19)	82.5 (13)
1990	73.3 (174)	79.4	79.4 (16)	79.9 (12)
1991	75.1 (166)	78.4	80.0 (16)	81.6 (13)
1992	76.2 (163)	79.5	83.6 (17)	83.6 (14)
1993	75.2 (169)	81.7	84.9 (20)	86.5 (16)
1994	75.1 (169)	80.8	89.1 (21)	89.1 (17)
1995	78.1 (223)	79.8	83.3 (53)	83.3 (53)
1996	78.1 (226)	82.4	86.3 (57)	86.3 (57)

Note: Values in cells represent indexed ACU scores (using the Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999 correction method) for House Republicans for the period 1971–96. Indexed ACU scores are used instead of “nominal” scores to control for the selection of different sets of votes each year by the ACU, which can lead to distortion of the underlying scale over time. Scores are broken down by all Republicans, Republican leaders (floor leaders, conference chairs, and whips), and by nonregional leaders (i.e., regional whips removed). Source for party leaders: *CQ Almanac* (1971–96).

in only 6 years are Republican leaders less far to the right than all Republicans. The same findings hold even more strongly for nonregional Republican party leaders. Their median ACU score is the same as, or to the right of, the median score for all Republicans in 22 of 26 years. Finally, examining only the median ACU score of the Republican floor leader and whip over a slightly longer time span, because our data allow us to go back further when we confine ourselves to the top two leaders (full data not reported), we discover that the median ACU score is to the right of the median ACU score of all Republicans in 28 of 30 years.

Visual examination of the data in these two tables supports the contention that House leaders tend to be located away from the mean and beyond the median ideological position of their respective parties, but are there statistically significant differences between the median ADA or ACU score of leaders and the median ADA or ACU score of all members? One way to test this proposition is to employ the Mann-Whitney test of the differences between these medians.¹⁹ If our hypothesis is correct, then there should be a significant difference between the median ADA or ACU scores of leaders and nonleaders, with the median ACU score of Republican leaders to the right of (i.e., greater than) the median of all Republicans and the median ADA score of Democratic leaders to the left of (i.e., greater than) the median of all Democrats.

Aggregating the data over the time period examined here confirms our expectations. The median ACU score of Republican leaders is 80 for all leaders and 83 for nonregional leaders, as compared to a median ACU score of 78 for all Republicans. Both differences are in the predicted direction. Both of these differences are significant at less than the .0001 level ($z = -4.81$ for all leaders and $z = -6.15$ for nonregional leaders). Similarly, not only is the median ADA score for all Democratic leaders (76) greater than the median for all Democrats (70), but this difference is statistically significant at less than .001 ($z = -12.24$). When we shift from ACU to ADA scores for Republicans as well, we find that the median ADA score of all Republican leaders (1965–96) is slightly over 9, in contrast to the median for all Republicans, which is greater than 11; this difference in medians is also significant at a probability level less than .0001 ($z = 6.45$).²⁰

Thus, the difference between the median ideological positions of House leaders and other members is different than zero in the predicted direction and highly statistically significant, despite the fact that this variable is bounded and hence maximum feasible differences between leaders and nonleaders are constrained. Thus, although the median of the ideological distribution of a given party well approximates the ideological predispositions of that party's leaders, predicting a position slightly to the right of the overall party median yields an improved prediction for Republican leaders, and predicting a position slightly to the left of the overall party median yields an improved prediction for Democratic leaders.

In sum, we find strong evidence for our hypothesis: party leaders (in both parties) tend to be drawn from the part of the ideological spectrum where the greatest concentration of their members lies, the area beyond the median toward the party mode.

Discussion

For the pooled data over the periods 1965–96 for Democrats and 1971–96 for Republicans, we conclude that, on balance, party leaders in the House are chosen slightly away from the median and toward the mode of their party. For example, for the period 1965–96, the modal (adjusted) ADA score of both Republican leaders and nonleaders is 4; for Democrats, the modal (adjusted) ADA score of leaders is 90, and for all Democrats, it is 85. In contrast, for the pooled data, the median and mean (adjusted) ADA scores for all Republicans are 11 and 18, respectively; the median and mean (adjusted) ADA scores for all Democrats are 70 and 63, respectively. These results are consistent with the policy partisanship theory hypothesis offered by Clausen and Wilcox (1987) and with recent models that emphasize the power of the modal voter, especially in situations involving multi-round balloting procedures (McGann 1997, 1999, 2002; McGann, Koetzle, and Grofman 2002a, b).²¹

The results stated above are based on a data distribution pooled over several decades. But, of course, the mean and variance of each party's ideological distribution (and the overlap between the two parties) has varied considerably over time (Grofman et al. forthcoming). If we were to look at the present Congress, for example, we would find that the modal Democrat and the modal Republican are about as far apart as it is possible to get in terms of roll-call voting scores. Thus, when taken in conjunction with the recent dramatic polarization of the two parties in the House (with virtually no overlap in the two ideological distributions), our findings help explain the bitterly divided politics we are presently experiencing. If we take the leadership position to be the one (publicly) advocated by the congressional party, then the fact that leaders in each party are at their party's mode means that the Democrat and Republican are even further apart than they would be if we were simply contrasting the mean or median positions of the two parties. In contrast, in time periods when there has been greater overlap in party distributions, when party distributions have been bimodal rather than unimodal, or when both of these scenarios have held, we would not expect to find such extreme differences between the modes in each party.

This point helps explain how to reconcile the clarity of our empirical findings on extremism of House leaders with the mixed results in the previous literature. It seems there is one key reason for the differences. We are looking at data primarily from recent congresses. For congresses in the period we examine, the within-party

ideological distributions tend to be unimodal—the Democrat’s “right tail” of conservative southern Democrats has been dramatically diminished and the Republican “left tail” of liberals excised from the party altogether. Moreover, the distribution of ideology within parties is clearly skewed; the median Democratic ADA score is to the left of the mean Democratic ADA score and the median Republican ADA score is to the right of the mean Republican ADA score. For earlier periods, both parties were more bimodal in their distributions, and this fact will give rise to different results—a much more mixed picture, since there are competing “modes.”

Our emphasis on the power of the modal voter in each party also has implications for recent debates about the nature of conditional party governance (Aldrich and Rohde 1998) and about the possibility of separating out ideology and party (see e.g., Krehbiel 2000). How tight party discipline can be expected to be, and thus how easily we might be able to separate party and ideological influences on roll-call votes will, in our view, depend upon the mean and variance of the two party distributions and the nature of the overlap between them, as other authors have argued.

Thus, contra Krehbiel, we do not think that it is essentially impossible to separate out party and ideology, although we would agree that, *at present*, this is a very, very difficult task. Our work introduces new ideas into these debates with its emphasis that the degree of party unity will also depend upon how close the modal voter in each party is to the median voter in that party. When the modal and the median members of each party are close together, and when the medians of the parties are far apart, as they are at present, party members will have little incentive to break party discipline. If the party mode is far from the party median, however, then to the extent that the grouping around the mode defines the party’s announced policy positions, many more members of the party will have reasons to be restless.

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NOTES

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1. Note, however, that the American politics and comparative politics literature on party leadership choices seem to have grown up largely independent of one another.

2. Relatedly, we might hypothesize that directly elected leaders will be more ideologically extreme than leaders chosen by seniority (i.e., committee chairs and ranking members).

3. Banks (1999, 89) observes that MRSE and variants thereof are also commonly used in Canada.

4. Koopman (1996), Peabody (1967), Rae (1989), Reiter (1981), Rohde (1991), and Schousen (1994), all argue, although in different ways, that factions have been important in coordinating leadership competition within the parties in the House.

5. The McGann model is related to the Tiebout (1956), Westhoff (1977, 1979), and Milchtaich and Winter (1997) models, wherein individuals sort themselves between communities on the basis of public good provision or some other criterion. This model is also similar to the models of political parties proposed by Robertson (1976), Aldrich (1983), and Aldrich and McGinnis (1989).

6. There is a considerable literature on party leadership selection mechanisms (see, for example, Carty and Blake 1999), but, as far as we know, this literature does not contain specific hypotheses about the effects of given voting rules on the relative extremism of leaders, although McSweeney (1999) considers the policy differences of plebiscitary versus internal leadership selection.

7. Their measure is obtained using the first two dimensions of NOMINATE scores, by Congress, which are then rotated by the angle provided by the rate of change in the PROBIT parameter estimate (Polser and Rhodes 1997, 358).

8. To test their theory, Clausen and Wilcox (1987) examined the policy positions along five different dimensions for the floor leader and whip of each party in the House and Senate during the 83d through 88th Congresses (1953–64) and 91st through 95th Congresses (1969–78). Although the data generally provide good evidence for the hypothesis, there is considerable variation in fit between the policy dimensions, between parties (with Republicans not conforming as well as Democrats), and between houses of Congress (the data for the House fit better than those for the Senate). Because Clausen and Wilcox use factor analysis to identify the various dimensions, their work is difficult to compare to the more straightforward, unidimensional (or, at most, two-dimensional) representations that have been used in other work on congressional ideology [e.g., Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores, American Conservative Union (ACU) scores, or D-Nominate scores].

9. This increase, however, has been largely among deputy and at-large leaders, with the role of regional whips declining precipitously. The Republicans have abandoned the regional whip designation as of the 104th Congress.

10. Clausen and Wilcox argue that a policy-specific approach is required because centrism may be acceptable in some domains but not in others (1987, 247), but they

also assert that leaders are chosen from a set of members who share agreement on a set of issues.

11. We use ADA scores for the Democrats and ACU scores for the Republicans because ADA tends to pick votes that finely differentiate between shades of liberalism but do not discriminate well among Republicans (most of whom score very low). ACU, conversely, picks votes that discriminate well among conservatives but score most Democrats uniformly low. See Brunell et al. (1999).

12. Because of the adjustment process, some adjusted scores may fall outside the 0–100 range.

13. The kernel density estimate of f_h of a univariate density f based on a random sample W_1, \dots, W_n is

$$f_{h(w)} = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{1}{h} K\left(\frac{w - W_i}{h}\right),$$

where h is the bandwidth and K is the kernel function. We use a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 2.5. The Gaussian kernel $K(z)$ is given by

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{z^2}{2}\right)$$

See Johnston and DiNardo 1997.

14. Regional party leaders are defined here as whips assigned to specific regions and elected by members from these regions. Separate data are included for these leaders because (1) the theory being examined here makes no claim about the ideology of these members (since they are elected only by a subset of all party members), and (2) previous research suggests that these types of leaders tend to conform ideologically to members from their own region (see Sinclair 1983, 1995). A test of this proposition showed that it was indeed the case, especially for Democratic regional whips.

15. The 1969 case also conforms to the theory, although here the case is reversed. The Democratic mean is to the left of the median; therefore, the policy partisanship theory implies that leaders should be to the right of the Democratic median and mean.

16. Only 30 total years are examined in Table 1 because we were not able to identify all party leaders in 1971 and 1972.

17. Year-by-year data for floor leaders and whips are not included in either Table 1 or Table 2 in the interest of space.

18. For these leaders (Democrat and Republican), data is included for 1971 and 1972.

19. The Mann-Whitney U statistic is defined as:

$$U = mn + \frac{m(m+1)}{2} - T,$$

where T is the sum of the ranks assigned to the sample of size m . T is calculated by ranking all $m + n$ observations in ascending order of magnitude, assigning to tied values the average rank, and then summing the ranks corresponding to the original sample of m observations (see Sprent 1989).

20. Full data omitted for space reasons.

21. See also Grofman et al. 1999, and Merrill et al. 1999.

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