TEN

The Effect of Municipal Election Structure on Black Representation in Eight Southern States

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THE PRECEDING CHAPTERS on the eight southern states covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act demonstrate how long and difficult has been the struggle for blacks, and Mexican Americans in Texas, to achieve full voting rights, and how various have been the devices and practices hindering their ability to elect their candidates of choice. In this chapter we provide a synoptic overview of the findings from these states about the effects of election type on black representation.

The chapter consists of four sections. In the first, we discuss the nature of the data from the state chapters and the features of the longitudinal design they share. In the second, we summarize evidence from the states on the relation between changes in local election systems and gains in black representation. In the third, we compare our findings with those of other scholars and explain the advantages of our research design over the cross-sectional design customarily employed to examine the impact of election structures. Finally, we consider the implications of our findings.

DATA BASE AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The proposal in 1988 to the National Science Foundation that originated the projects reported in this volume had as one of its central aims the generation of a data set that could be used to resolve a continuing controversy about the causes of the gains in black officeholding in the South over the past two decades. The conventional view holds that at-large and multimember election systems are barriers to the election of blacks and that a central cause of gains in black representation at the state and local level in the South has been the change from at-large or multimember plans to single-member-district ones. As the state chapters have shown, black political leaders and interest groups have challenged at-large elections throughout the South in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,[1] acting on the premise that in local jurisdictions with substantial black voting strength where previous black success was minimal or nonexistent, the replacement of at-large elections by single-member districts that fairly reflected black population concentrations would increase black representation. Recently, however, some

authors have disputed the claim that changes to single-member districts are necessary to increase black officeholding.[2]

In order to measure appropriately the impact of electoral systems on minority representation at the local level for the eight southern states that have been the chief focus of litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act and to address issues of causal inference that cannot be resolved with cross-sectional analysis—the approach typically used to investigate the impact of election type on minority representation—the authors of the state chapters contributed to the development of a large data base for southern cities. Data collection was linked to a longitudinal research design that required a detailed inventory of the changes that occurred in municipal election structures in these states over the course of recent decades.[3]

Research Design

Generally speaking, each of the state chapters as well as this one use information gathered for the early 1970s and the late 1980s to measure changes in minority representation on city council in two types of cities: those which changed from at-large to either single-member-district or mixed plans and those at-large cities which did not change.[4] The data base for each state identifies the number of black local officials at each of two times for each city in the state above a certain population size and minority percentage.[5] It also identifies the election system in use at each time: at-large, single-member district, or mixed.[6]

Special features of the research design are noteworthy. First, because the data collected are from two different periods, they allow before-and-after comparisons of minority representation in cities that replaced at-large elections with either district or mixed systems. Because each before-and-after comparison pertains to the same city, this approach "holds constant," roughly speaking, those factors which might vary if the comparison were between sets of cities grouped according to their present-day election system.[7]

Second, the design includes a control group of cities that did not change election type. This allows a direct comparison over time between results in the changed cities and those in the control cities, an improvement on certain earlier before-and-after studies of minority representation.[8] The unchanged cities control for other effects besides election structures that might have impinged on all cities over time, such as general changes in political culture resulting from, say, white voters' increased willingness to vote for black candidates.

Third, the chapter authors have generated several data sets that together provide important information about minority representation, changes in election system, and voting rights litigation. In particular, there is information about temporal changes in minority representation in cities that shifted wholly or in part from at-large elections to districts. Too, there are cross-sectional data from all cities both at the starting point and the end point of our studies, allowing comparisons at two different times. There is also information that allows us to compare the representa-

tion of blacks in the at-large and district components of mixed plans. Moreover, one type of data enables us to combine information on individual single-member districts in districted cities (both pure single-member district and mixed cities) to determine the extent of black officeholding at each level of black population in these districts and, in particular, the degree to which black officeholding in districts depends upon their having a black population majority.

Characteristics of the Data Set

Table 10.1 presents basic characteristics of the principal data set used in all the state chapters.[9] The data were collected for two points separated on average by about fifteen years. The earlier time was 1974 in a plurality of states, but for Alabama it was 1970; for North Carolina, 1973; for Virginia, 1977; and for Georgia, 1980. The later time was 1989 for all states except Georgia, for which it was 1990.

Another measurement variation in the state chapters is the minority population proportion. In all but two of the states, only cities with a black population of 10 percent or more were examined.[10] Exceptions are Texas, where a combined black and Hispanic population of 10 percent is the threshold for most of the tables in that chapter,[11] and North Carolina, where a combined black and American Indian population threshold of 10 percent is used.[12]

A third variation in the state chapters is city size. Data were collected in each state, using 1980 census figures for cities over a certain size. The population threshold is 1,000 in Mississippi; 2,500 in Louisiana; 6,000 in Alabama; and 10,000 in Georgia, Texas, and South Carolina. In North Carolina all incorporated cities are examined, including cities with population of fewer than 500.[13] The Virginia chapter reports on all cities that are "independent." As a result, cities with as few as 4,840 inhabitants are included for that state.

By focusing on the southern states with the greatest black population proportion and by developing data on a large set of cities, we have enough cases to ascertain patterns of black officeholding in each state and thus to detect variations and similarities among the states. Because most of the state projects gathered data on cities within a broad population range, this is one of the largest data bases (over 1,000 cities) ever used to examine the impact of election structure on minority representation, despite the fact that it is drawn from only eight states.

The Effect of Election Type on Black Representation in Cities in Eight Southern States

The primary purpose of our analysis is to determine the effects of election structure on black officeholding. However, if we were to use election structure as the sole independent variable, we would risk ignoring important nonelectoral differences and reaching erroneous conclusions. Our research design was developed to allow

us to isolate certain other factors that are thought to have an independent influence on black officeholding. Because our analysis focuses solely on the eight southern states now covered entirely or in large part by section 5, possible differences between the South and the rest of the country are effectively controlled. Because we have data for individual states, the differential influence of statewide cultural norms or political practices can also be controlled. And because we categorize cities by their black population percentage, the independent impact of that variable is also controlled.[14]

City size is another variable alleged to have an independent influence on minority officeholding in the South. Our data, indeed, suggest that at-large elections have a more constraining influence on black officeholding in small towns than anywhere else. Because the state chapters differ in the population threshold used to select cities for inclusion in their data base, the inclusion of very small cities in some states but not in others could bias our conclusions. Later in this chapter, therefore, we will report certain key data only for cities that are 10,000 or larger in total population.

Tables 10.2A–C reports data separately for each state on the black percentage among elected city council members at the beginning and end of the period under investigation. The last row reports a mean value for the eight states, which is the simple unweighted average of the individual state values.[15] To control for the effects of black population size, we use the same three black population categories in tables 10.2A–C that are used in the state chapters.[16] The figures shown are only for those cities for which we had complete longitudinal data that elected all council members at large at the starting point of our study. Thus tables 10.2A–C presents results in those at-large cities which changed election system and those which did not. The data reported in tables 10.2A–C allow inferences to be made about what happened when at-large elections in southern cities were replaced by district or mixed systems.

There are six basic components in this set of tables. These components are linked together in pairs ("before" and "after"): the initial percentage of black elected officials in cities that changed from an at-large to a district plan and the subsequent percentage in those cities; the initial percentage of black officials in cities that changed from an at-large to a mixed system and the subsequent percentage in those cities; and the initial percentage of black officials in the unchanged cities and the subsequent percentage in those cities. These six values are reported in the first six data columns of tables 10.2A–C. The columns also show the number of cases in each cell. Examination of each of the before-and-after comparisons tells how much black officeholder percentages changed in each of the three types of cities.

The data from Louisiana provide a convenient illustration of how to read the three parts of the table. In that state's cities that were 10–29.9 percent black, table 10.2A shows that in the period from 1974 to 1989 there were dramatic gains in black representation. Among the cities in that population category that changed

election system, the black percentage on council rose from 0 to 27 percent in cities that shifted from an at-large to a district plan and from 3 to 19 percent in the those that shifted from an at-large to a mixed plan.[17] While jumps of 27 percentage points (27 − 0) for the single-member-district cities or 16 percentage points for the mixed cities may not look all that large, they are in fact very large relative to black population proportions, since the mean black population in the cities that were between 10 and 29.9 percent black was only 25.4 percent among the Louisiana cities that shifted to single-member districts and only 23.5 percent among the cities that shifted to a mixed plan. Thus the *growth* in black representation *relative to black population* in the Louisiana cities that shifted to single-member districts was 105 percent (26.7/25.4), and it was 69 percent (16.2/23.5) in the cities that shifted to mixed plans—a dramatic increase.[18]

However, not all of the growth in black representation can be attributed to change in election type. Even in the Louisiana cities that retained at-large systems, black representation increased from 0 to 10 percent. Therefore, because the gain in black representation in cities shifting to districts was 27 percentage points as compared to a gain of only 10 points in cities that retained their at-large plan, the shift to single-member districts can be thought of as having yielded a *net increase* in black representation of 27 − 10 = 17 points. In like manner, table 10.2B shows that the shift to districts yielded a net increase of 17 points in Louisiana cities that were 30–49.9 percent black, and table 10.2C shows a net gain of 24 points as a result of changing to districts even for the state's majority-black cities.

The information in table 10.2 can thus be used to gauge the independent effect of adopting a new type of election system. By looking at the difference between the growth in black representation in the jurisdictions shifting from an at-large to a single-member or mixed system and the growth in the jurisdictions that remained at-large throughout the entire period of roughly fifteen years, one can determine whether or not the gains in minority representation were greater in the cities that changed election systems than in those which remained at large. The value of this "difference resulting from change" variable is reported in the last two columns of tables 10.2A–C for single-member-district and mixed systems. In effect, by subtracting values for the unchanged cities from those for the cities that changed election type,[19] we are using change in black officeholding in the units that did not change election type as a base-line control for *maturation effects*—changes in the dependent variable that are unrelated to the impact of the changes whose consequences we are investigating, such as increased willingness among white voters to support black candidates.[20]

The tables show that in a substantial number of states, the level of black representation in majority-white cities that continuously elected at large did not change much over the previous two decades. In Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, the growth in black representation in cities that were 10–29.9 percent black ranged between 1 and 3 percentage points; while in North Carolina and South Carolina cities that were 30–49.9 percent black, the growth was only 4

and 7 points, respectively. Indeed, in the one Georgia at-large city in this population category, there was actually a decline in black representation during the period under investigation.[21]

Majority-White Cities that Changed from At-Large to Single-Member-District Systems

If the conventional view of at-large elections is true, majority-white cities changing to a pure district system are the ones where we would expect to observe the largest increases in black officeholding. That is exactly what we find in tables 10.2A–C. On average, across the eight states, black gains in majority-white cities were considerably larger in those adopting single-member districts than in those that remained at large.[22] For cities that were 10–29.9 percent black, the average gain in those shifting to districts was 23 points, and for cities that were 30–49.9 percent black, 34 points. In contrast, for cities that were 10–29.9 percent black that remained at large, the gain was only 6 percentage points, and for cities that were 30–49.9 percent black, 14 percentage points. The average net gain for cities that changed to districts relative to those that remained at-large was 16 and 19 points for those that were 10–29.9 and 30–49.9 percent black, respectively.[23] Relative to the black population levels in those cities, the gains attributable *directly* to change in election type were quite large.

The same general pattern is found in virtually all eight individual states, in eleven of the thirteen instances for which data are available to make comparisons.[24] Moreover, one of the two deviant cases is based on a single observation. On the face of it, the Texas case would seem to indicate that a 50 percent black council in 1989 was elected in a majority-white city. But although we present the case in this table for consistency of our treatment of the data, it is misleading, inasmuch as the city's population actually changed from majority white to majority black between 1980 and 1990, a change not reflected in the table because we used 1980 as a measure of both our 1970 and 1990 black population proportions.[25] Furthermore, treating this now majority-black city in table 10.2 as a majority-white city visibly increases the eight-state average we report for the at-large cities in the 30–49.9 percent category, inasmuch as the results in this single city are the results reported for the state of Texas a whole. Had we simply excluded that city, the average gains in at-large cities that were 30–49.9 percent black would have been only 9 percentage points rather than 14, and the net advantage of single-member districts over at-large plans would have increased from 19 to 25 points.

The other case with unexpected results involves three Alabama cities that were 10–29.9 percent black and remained at large, whose gains were equal to those in cities which adopted districts. However, we believe this anomaly can also be accounted for. The discrepancy between observed and predicted results is based on the only majority-white cities in Alabama that retained at-large elections in 1989. There were forty-two cities that elected at large in 1970, compared to only three in

1989. To anticipate our discussion of selection bias, the evidence suggests that the three Alabama cities retaining at-large elections as late as 1989 were atypical of the broader set of forty-two cities in the degree to which black candidates were elected.

Majority-White Cities that Changed from At-Large to Mixed Systems

The general expectation is that majority-white cities changing from an at-large to a mixed plan will also witness an increase in black officeholding, although not as great as in cities changing to a pure district plan, given the continued presence of some at-large seats. This is precisely what the data in tables 10.2A–C show, on average, across the eight states. For cities that were 10–29.9 percent black, the average gain among those shifting to a mixed plan was 13 points, and in cities that were 30–49.9 percent black, 25 points, for a gain over equivalent unchanged cities of 6 and 10 points, respectively. This compares to the corresponding net gains in the cities that shifted to single-member districts of 16 and 19 points, respectively.

The same pattern is found in virtually every state, in eleven of the fourteen instances for which data are available to make such comparisons. Moreover, as in the comparison between at-large systems and those changing to districts, the Texas exception results from mischaracterizing a city as majority white in 1989 because we use 1980 rather than 1990 population data; the Alabama exception is based on the only three majority-white cities in our data set that were still electing at large in 1989.

Majority-Black Cities

In majority-black jurisdictions, if blacks voted as a bloc, common sense might suggest that they should be able to elect their preferred candidates and perhaps even exclude whites from office if they wished, just as majority-white populations often have done to black candidates when elections are conducted at large. On the other hand, majority-black cities are disproportionately in the rural black belt, where black registration has historically been low and where whites have been particularly resistant to black strivings for equality.[26] Thus another version of common sense might predict, alternatively, that black representation would be low in majority-black areas electing at large—initially, at least.

In actuality, the mean growth in black representation in the majority-black cities adopting disticts was 53 percentage points in the five states for which there were such cities, while in the majority-black cities that changed to a mixed plan in the six states containing such cities, the gain was 32 points. These changes compare to a gain of 22 points in cities remaining at-large in the four states where there were such unchanged cities. In short, even for majority-black cities, the change to single-member districts yielded a considerable net advantage in minority representation; further, a change to a mixed plan also produced greater gains in black representation than was true for cities that remained at large.[27]

Summary of Findings in Tables 10.2A–C

On average,[28] the greatest effect of a change from an at-large plan to single-member districts occurred in majority-black cities (53 percentage points); the next greatest effect occurred in cities that were 30–49.9 percent black (34 points); and the lowest but still substantial effect occurred in cities that were 10–29.9 percent black (23 percentage points).[29] In terms of the net difference measure, the equivalent net gains were 33, 19, and 16 percentage points, respectively.

Results of changes to mixed systems, measured in terms of net gain, paralleled those of changes to pure district systems in that the greatest net effect of change to a mixed plan occurred in majority-black cities, followed by that in cities that were 30–49.9 percent black, and then by that in cities that were 10–29.9 percent black; but the net change values were not nearly as great: 15, 10, and 6 points, respectively, compared to 33, 19, and 16 points, respectively, for cities that changed to single-member districts.

In sum, the overall patterns in the three tables reveal the effects of change to single-member districts on black representation levels to be quite substantial, relative to black population percentage, even after we imposed a control for possible maturation effects by subtracting the growth in black representation that takes place in unchanged at-large cities. There were smaller but still significant gains in black representation achieved in the cities that shifted to mixed plans. The fact that the greatest net gains occurred in majority-black cities was unexpected, but the pattern of an increasing net impact of change in election systems as black population proportion increases is consistent with the view that whites' concern about black electoral impact becomes greater as the possibility grows that blacks can actually elect their preferred candidates in significant proportions and is greatest where blacks might actually be able to control the system.[30] It is also important to recognize that majority-black cities in the 1970s were likely to have been ones in which white bloc voting was especially high and black registration low. Moreover, many of the majority-black cities in our data base were unlikely to have been majority black in either registration or turnout in the early 1970s. Also, as noted earlier, some of the majority-black jurisdictions in our data set were only slightly more than 50 percent black and may not even have had black voting-age majorities.[31]

The Effect of Election Type on Representational Equity

An alternate use of the data in tables 10.2A–C is to transform the percentages of black elected officials into a ratio measure of black representational equity. Tables 10.3A–B, analogous to table 5 in each of the state chapters, presents a snapshot of the situation in the cities at the beginning (10.3A) and end (10.3B) of the period.[32]

The values of the black ratio equity measure (referred to from now on as *equity scores*) indicate the percentage of black officials on city council as a proportion of the percentage of blacks in the city.[33] A value of 1.00 indicates that black represen-

tation is perfectly proportional to black population, while smaller values indicate less, and larger values greater, than proportional representation.[34] The virtue of the ratio measure is that it controls for black population percentage across cities. Our use of this measure, however, is strictly a mathematical convenience.[35] It is not intended to imply that the legal standard for an ethnic minority group's right to participate equally in the political system is or should be proportional representation by officeholders of that ethnic group.

Table 10.3A demonstrates two very important facts. First, on average, majority-white single-member-district cities provided very close to proportional representation for blacks as the 1980s came to a close: cities that were 10–29.9 percent black had a mean equity score of 1.14, and cities that were 30–49.9 percent black had a score of 0.92. Second, black representation in majority-white at-large cities was very much lower: 0.53 and 0.56, respectively.

If we look at the data on a state-by-state basis, there are no exceptions to the first generalization. As for the second one, if we exclude as misleading the at-large Texas city 30–49.9 percent black that was majority black in 1990 but is classified as majority white, the only real exceptions are the three Alabama at-large cities already referred to, although Virginia at-large cities that were 30–49.9 percent black also had unusually high equity scores (0.83), as did Texas at-large cities that were 10–29.9 percent black (0.75).[36]

In majority-white cities, table 10.3A shows that, on average, black representation in mixed plans was intermediate between that in district and at-large plans but closer to the equity scores in the district ones. Cities 10–29.9 percent black had a mean equity score of 0.85, as did those 30–49.9 percent black. The generalization that equity of black representation in mixed plans was intermediate between that in district and at-large plans holds for most of the states where comparisons are possible.[37]

In majority-black cities in all states that had them, districted systems provided very close to proportional representation for blacks; the mean equity score was 0.92. We have data for only four states showing what happens in majority-black jurisdictions that elected at large. (South Carolina and Texas had no majority-black cities in the data set; in Georgia and Virginia, none of the handful of majority-black cities elected at large.) In Alabama, majority-black cities electing at large had high levels of black representation (a mean equity score of 1.09). In two other states black representation was moderate in majority-black at-large cities: Louisiana had a score of 0.80 and Mississippi, 0.70. However, North Carolina was a dramatic exception to this pattern of high or moderate black representation in majority-black jurisdictions electing at large, with an equity score of only 0.14. Black representation in majority-black jurisdictions was actually lower for mixed cities than for at-large cities in three of the four states for which direct comparisons are possible (with North Carolina the exception), but differences were not large.

Table 10.3B demonstrates that in the early period, usually the early 1970s, at-large cities—either those which subsequently changed election system or the ones

that did not—were providing nothing close to proportional representation for blacks. Indeed, the equity scores of majority-white at-large cities at this time were minuscule. Only in five categories of cities out of forty-four were mean equity scores above 0.40, and in twenty-one categories the score was 0.00. Data for the 1970s are not shown for Georgia, which has a starting point of 1980. However, even as late as 1980, black representation in the majority-white at-large cities in that state was far from proportional, although it was greater than that reflected in the 1970s data for most of the other states in table 10.3B.[38]

Black Representation at the District Level

If, as tables 10.2 and 10.3 indicate, at-large elections depressed the share of offices held by blacks, the reason seems clear. In many cities employing this method, whites voted largely as a bloc for white candidates, and, constituting the majority of the electorate, they were able to prevent the election of blacks. Thus our findings indirectly lend weight to the view that many whites in southern cities have not been receptive to black candidacies. As this is contrary to the recent views of a number of media commentators and a few scholars, it is useful to pursue the matter of white voting preferences further. Thanks to other information our state chapter authors collected, we are able to do this.

The additional information is contained in two data sets. Unlike the information on which tables 10.2A–C and 10.3A–B are based, where cities are the units of analysis, these data sets include information at the level of individual districts. One set, for cities with mixed plans, allows us to compare the percentage of black officials in 1989 (or in 1990 where Georgia is concerned) who were elected from both district and at-large seats in the same city. Another data set for cities with mixed and pure district plans allows us to compare the percentage of black officials in districts of varying racial composition. If white voting patterns were changing significantly in the 1980s, the evidence should indicate, first, that in mixed cities blacks would be elected from both districted and at-large components in similar proportions and, second (when black population proportion is controlled), that in single-member-district cities, numerous blacks would be elected from majority-white as well as from majority-black districts. Neither of these expectations is fulfilled.

Table 10.4 shows the mean equity score in the at-large and districted components of mixed plans.[39] In a majority-white city the constituency for the at-large seats will be majority white too, while some individual districts will probably have black majorities. The obverse is true for at-large majority-black cities. Therefore, by comparing the results of district and at-large elections in mixed cities, we can determine whether blacks fare better in majority-white constituencies (the at-large component of majority-white cities) than in constituencies of which some are majority black. Inasmuch as the comparison is between results from two types of election *in the same city*, many of the variables that might affect black representation independently of election type are controlled in a way they would not be in a cross-sectional comparison of results *between cities*.

The findings are clear. In majority-white cities, blacks were very rarely elected at large, but in the district components, they were elected in proportions roughly comparable to their population percentage in the cities. Indeed, in Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina, *all* black representation in the *majority-white mixed cities* came from the district components.[40] In point of fact, even in the majority-black cities with a mixed election system, blacks were more nearly represented proportionally in the district than in the at-large component. In Alabama, North Carolina, and Virginia, the at-large components in the *majority-black mixed* cities elected *no* blacks at all.[41]

Further evidence bearing on the inability of blacks in majority-white venues to win city council offices in the eight states is found in table 10.5. Containing data from pure district and mixed plans, this table shows the percentage of black officials elected in districts of varying racial composition.

In districts less than 30 percent black, the likelihood of blacks being elected was virtually nil. Indeed, even in districts 30–39.9 percent black, the percentage of black elected officials was zero in four of the seven states for which we have data, although it was not far from proportional in two of the remaining three states. The pattern in districts 40–49.9 percent black was more varied: in two of the four states for which we have data, no blacks were elected from such districts, but in the remaining two states, black representation was close to proportional.[42]

There was also a varied pattern in districts 50–59.9 percent black, but much less so, and a threshold was apparently reached in five of the seven states for which data are available. In these states black representation was greater than black population proportion, and in a sixth state, Louisiana, districts 50–59.9 percent black provided very close to black proportional representation.[43] On average across the states, 74 percent of the districts elected a black representative. In fact, in states such as North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, a 50–59.9 percent black district population was sufficient to guarantee election of a black. In districts more than 60 percent black, black representation was either 100 percent or close to it in all southern states except Mississippi, where the likelihood of black representation remained below one-half until districts were over 65 percent black.[44]

Summarizing the Findings in Tables 10.4 and 10.5

The patterns in tables 10.4 and 10.5 are even starker than those in tables 10.2 and 10.3 and point to the persistence of racially polarized voting not only in at-large cities but in the at-large component of mixed cities and at the level of individual districts in cities that were districted.[45] However, the level of black disadvantage varied. In pure at-large elections in majority-white cities, the degree of black success, although far below that in the pure district cities, still was considerably greater than that in the at-large components of mixed systems in majority-white cities, or than that in individual districts that were majority white. Indeed, table 10.5 shows black officeholding in single-member districts 10–29.9 percent black to be at or near zero and to be dramatically low even in the single-member districts 30–49.9 percent black.[46]

Comparisons between Southern Regions

Considering the scholarly attention traditionally given to differences in race relations between the Deep South and the Outer South, we compared these two regions in our eight-state sample, treating Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina as Deep South states and North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia as belonging to the Outer South. Surprisingly, differences between Deep South and Outer South states in the effects of at-large elections on black representation were not that large, and in many ways North Carolina, despite its reputation for liberalism, had one of the poorest records of black representation of any state, especially in at-large settings.[47] However, especially with respect to table 10.5, it is Mississippi, as might be expected, that appears to have white behavior least likely to be conducive to black electoral success.

Comparing Results of Changed Election Plans on Black Representation in Cities and Counties

The findings on minority representation at the county level in the three states for which county data were collected closely mirror those for cities. On the one hand, relatively high levels of minority representation were observed in the majority-white counties that used single-member districts or mixed plans. On the other hand, at-large majority-white counties scored quite low on black representational equity.

Comparing cities and counties with the same levels of black population, we find a consistent pattern of differences between the two levels of governments in only one of the three states. Equity scores were consistently lower in Georgia counties than in Georgia cities for all types of election systems and levels of black population.[48] In North Carolina and South Carolina, however, for given levels of black population and election type, there was higher representational equity sometimes at the city level and sometimes at the county level.[49]

Comparing Results from Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Data

The findings so far summarized in this chapter might appear to be old news. As we noted in the Editors' Introduction, numerous studies published in the 1970s and 1980s comparing black candidates' success in different election systems led to a scholarly consensus that single-member districts were in general far more advantageous to blacks than were multimember ones. Yet this consensus has been challenged by recent data suggesting that racial polarization is declining and that at-large elections are no longer as pernicious as they once were, even in the South. For example, Thernstrom, in a 1987 book sharply critical of the use, generally, of the Voting Rights Act to compel the creation of majority-minority districts, has argued that racial polarization was a much less serious problem than many minority leaders and voting rights attorneys and experts believed it to be.[50]

The most important study on the effects of election structure on black representation using data more recent than that from the 1970s or very early 1980s is by Welch, a leading specialist in minority representation.[51] Her well-designed and methodologically sophisticated cross-sectional study analyzed all U.S. cities with a 1984 population of at least 50,000 and containing a black or Hispanic population in 1980 of at least 5 percent but less than 50 percent. There were 218 cities with the requisite black population that she analyzed and 155 with the requisite Hispanic population, although many of the same cities composed her two ethnic subsamples.[52] Because her data were gathered in 1988, at least seven years after the previous major study, she could rightly claim to shed light on minority representation near the end of the 1980s and on changes from earlier patterns.[53] Her 1990 study is also important because her previous work had done much to buttress the conclusion that at-large elections sharply reduced minority representation.

Welch's most striking finding was that by 1988, black representational equity in at-large elections in majority-white cities of at least 50,000 population had increased significantly, while it remained high in majority-white cities with district and mixed plans. After controlling for the effects of black population percentage, she reported a significant closing of the gap in black officeholding between at-large and districted majority-white cities above this population threshold. In particular, Welch found that by 1988, black representation in southern majority-white at-large cities of 50,000 or more with a black population of at least 10 percent[54] had grown to the point where the ratio equity score in such cities was 0.83.[55] In contrast, studies of the 1970s had found scores in comparable cities nationwide to range roughly between 0.50 and 0.60.[56] Welch found that at-large cities had progressed in the South by another measure as well: the proportion of cities of at least 50,000 with a black population of at least 10 percent in which no blacks sat on council had dropped to 9 percent as compared to the 44 percent at the national level reported in an earlier study she had coauthored.[57] Moreover, contrary to findings for earlier decades, black representational equity in at-large plans in majority-white southern cities was actually greater than that in comparable cities in the North.[58]

Relying on evidence such as that reported in Welch's 1990 study, and also placing reliance on the results of certain highly visible political contests, particularly the election of Douglas Wilder as governor of Virginia, some observers profess to see a dramatic change in the past decade or so in white willingness to vote for black candidates in majority-white southern venues. A few observers have suggested that some or even most lawsuits in recent years seeking to effect a change from at-large to district elections were unnecessary and perhaps even injurious to the best interests of blacks.[59] This claim, we believe, is erroneous.[60]

It is important not to overstate the extent of differences between Welch's findings and earlier ones—something she herself is careful not to do. As she points out, while black representational equity had risen to 0.83 in the southern majority-white at-large cities of at least 50,000 population with a 10 percent or greater black population, the equity score for comparable districted cities in the South was still higher: 0.95. Also, when Welch compared at-large and district components of mixed systems in 1988, she, like us, found few black officeholders elected from

the at-large components. For the southern majority-white mixed cities above 10 percent black, the black equity score she found was 1.05 in the districted component but only 0.24 in the at-large one.[61] Moreover, she found that representational equity in the at-large component of mixed plans in majority-white cities had actually *declined* at the national level since the 1970s. These findings alone undercut an unqualified claim that at-large elections no longer significantly disadvantage black voters, and they raise serious questions about claims of a sharp decline in racially polarized patterns of voting in the South.[62]

However, there are important differences between Welch's findings and ours that need to be discussed and explained. In particular, in majority-white southern cities for 1989–90, our cross-sectional data in table 10.3A show a far greater gap in black officeholding between at-large and district plans than Welch's study revealed for majority-white southern cities in 1988. We find a mean equity score for at-large cities that were 10–29.9 percent black of only 0.53, and we find an equity score of only 0.56 for cities that were 30–49.9 percent black—both far lower success rates than the 0.83 figure Welch reports for the combined set of southern majority-white cities that were at least 10 percent black.[63] And while it is true that in the eight states studied in this volume—with only one exception[64]—cities retaining at-large systems also showed gains in the proportion of black elected officials, these gains were far smaller than those in the cities which abolished at-large elections.

How can we explain the apparent contradiction between the Welch study and the data presented here? There are two reasons for the differences. One critical reason is that her 1988 data are restricted to cities of 50,000 or larger. When smaller cities and towns are examined, a very different picture emerges of the impact of at-large elections on black officeholding in recent years.[65] A second reason is that we employ a research procedure that, unlike hers, allows for a test of the hypothesis that at-large cities today are not representative of at-large cities of twenty years ago because of selection bias. For selection bias renders highly suspect claims about what the level of black officeholding would have been if the cities adopting mixed or district plans had remained at large—claims based on the assumption that the cities that changed would have had the same minority success rates as the cities that remained at large.

In the following section we first present evidence for our conclusion that very populous at-large cities differ from small cities with respect to the relation between election type and the level of black officeholding. Then, in the succeeding section, we examine evidence for a selection bias in cross-sectional research, taking advantage of the longitudinal aspects of our data base for southern cities.

The Significance of Differences in City Size Thresholds

Most careful studies of the effect of election structures have been limited to cities 25,000 or larger or 50,000 or larger. The latter threshold was used by Welch. There are only twenty-three such southern cities 10 percent or more black in her 1988

data base that still used at-large elections and were majority white.[66] Thirteen of those twenty-three cities are also in our data base.[67] For those thirteen we find an equity ratio of 0.70 for cities that were 10–49.9 percent black, closer to her figure of 0.83 than to the equity scores of 0.53 and 0.56 we report for at-large cities in table 10.3A for cities in the 10–29.9 and 30–49.9 percent black population categories, respectively. There are simply few very large southern cities that still elect at large, and almost all of these have elected appreciable proportions of black officials. However, at-large elections in majority-white cities are far less favorable to minority candidates in cities below 50,000. In the remainder of this section we look at city size effects on black representation in our data set. The eight state projects used different city size thresholds, with the result that states with low thresholds or none—North Carolina is a case in point—add a disproportionate number of cases to the category of smaller cities. Barring the use of a weighting procedure, we are therefore unable to control for the possible effects of state-specific influences. To remedy this problem, we decided to impose a size threshold of 10,000 on our eight-state data base and to analyze all cities in the resulting sample. Tables 10.6A–C and 10.7A–B report the extent of changes in black officeholding for all cities of at least 10,000 in 1980 that were at least 10 percent black in a fashion that parallels tables 10.2A–C and 10.3A–B, respectively.[68]

Since all the cities are at least 10,000 in size, and cases from North Carolina no longer dominate the sample, we can also report in tables 10.6A–C and 10.7A–B an average across states that uses cities as the units, in addition to one that averages across states as was done in tables 10.2A–C and 10.3A–B.[69]

The results largely corroborate our earlier ones with respect to the higher levels of black representation in the cities that changed election type as compared with those that remained at large. However, it is clear that in some states city size had a significant independent impact on black officeholding. More generally, we find a higher average level of black representation in the at-large cities 10,000 and above in population than in the full set of cities in our larger data set. For the cities that were 10,000 and up we get results more like those of Welch in her 1990 study of cities above 50,000, especially for cities that were 30–49.9 percent black. For example, using cities as our units for calculating means, we find in table 10.7A an equity score of 0.57 in the at-large cities that were 10–29.9 percent black and a score of 0.78 in the at-large cities that were 30–49.9 percent black.

In Mississippi and North Carolina, the two states where choice of the size threshold had the greatest impact on the number of cities included in the data set, the equity score at the end of the period was substantially higher for cities above 10,000 than for the entire set of cities in the two states' data base. In at-large cities of 10,000 or more, the scores were 0.58 and 0.51, respectively, in cities that were 10–29.9 percent black (table 10.7A), as compared to scores of 0.41 and 0.14 for the larger data set that includes the smaller cities (table 10.3A). Continuing the same mode of comparison, at-large cities that were 30–49.9 percent black in these two states produced equity scores of "not applicable" and 0.82, respectively, as compared to equity values of only 0.26 and 0.14 for the larger data set for the two states.

In Louisiana and Virginia, however, the pattern of greater equity scores in the larger cities as compared to the smaller cities was not present. For at-large cities of at least 10,000 that were 10–29.9 percent black, the scores in 1989 were 0.00, and 0.64, respectively, as compared to values of 0.60 and 0.56 for the larger data set. For the more populous at-large cities that were 30–49.9 percent black, the scores were 1.13, and 0.76, respectively, as compared to 0.52 and 0.83 for the larger data set. In Alabama the same three at-large majority-white cities compose the entire category in tables 10.3A–B and table 10.7A–B, and thus no evaluation of the effect of city size is possible for that state.[70]

All in all, the most striking aspect of these comparisons is that while the influence of city size varies somewhat within states, black representation was abysmally low in the hundreds of very small majority-white jurisdictions in North Carolina and in Mississippi—the former a state in the Outer South long enjoying a reputation for racial moderation, the latter a Deep South state whose name has been synonymous with racial reaction. Another important finding is that majority-white cities above 10,000 were far more likely to have eliminated the at-large plan than were the smaller commmunities. Only 36 percent of the cities above 10,000 still maintained at-large elections in the late 1980s, far lower than the 79 percent of cities in the full data set (which includes the small cities and towns) that maintained at-large elections.[71] Clearly, in some states, voting rights litigation has hardly begun to penetrate barriers to black officeholding in the rural areas. This fact is ignored in research such as Welch's that is limited to larger cities.

The dearth of black representation in the smaller cities of the South is particularly noteworthy because these communities, especially the very small ones, may be those where conditions of life for blacks have changed the least since 1965. If so, the absence of black participation in governance may be especially critical. This possibility takes on additional importance when one realizes that the number of blacks still living in small communities is considerable. In North Carolina, for example, more than two-thirds of all blacks in 1980 lived in cities of less than 25,000.

Problems that May Result from Selection Bias

We now turn to the problem of selection bias. The question we wish to answer is whether the equity scores in at-large election plans in 1989 were typical of scores we would have observed if all the cities that were at large at an earlier period had remained at large. In a strict sense, no one can answer this question because it concerns a counterfactual situation. We cannot know certainly what the facts would have been had the situation been different and none of the cities changed election system.

Nonetheless, a longitudinal design does enable us to approach this question in a manner that a cross-sectional one does not. The results, we believe, are quite suggestive. Because we have two data points for each city, separated by about fifteen years, we can look back to the time of the early data and compare the

characteristics of 1989–90 at-large cities at that earlier time, with the characteristics of those at-large cities that later changed. Differences between these two sets of cities, all originally at large, could provide persuasive grounds for concluding that the remaining at-large cities were indeed atypical.

We define selection bias as a situation where the treatment (in this instance, "change in election system") is not causally independent of the dependent variable, that is, "black officeholding." For example, in the situation under analysis, selection bias could occur because a city's abolition of its at-large election system was linked to black success in gaining office under that system. This link is highly plausible. Given the application of the law under the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment since the mid-1970s, an at-large system generally is more likely to be challenged by a voting rights lawsuit or faced with a threat thereof, and litigation is more likely to be successful (or any threat of litigation is more likely to be credible) if minorities have not been successful in gaining office under it.[72] Therefore, cities that are still at large at the end of a period in this time span can be expected to be a nonrandom sample of the cities that were at large at the beginning of the period. In particular, cities that are still at-large at the end of the period may disproportionately be those cities where minorities had achieved some electoral success early on.

If this is true, then these at-large cities—the ones examined by a cross-sectional design at the end of the period—would be "selected" through a biased process. It is now obvious why the longitudinal approach is especially useful in tackling this issue. It enables us to examine all the cities that were at large at the beginning and to see whether the subset of them that were still at large at the end had higher initial black equity scores, on average, than the subset that later adopted mixed or district plans. If this turns out to be true, there is strong evidence that cities still retaining the at-large system were probably more accessible to black officeholders than is true of the full set of at-large cities at the beginning of the period.

The possibility of selection bias in a sample analyzed by the cross-sectional method was obvious to Welch, who herself posed this question: was the recent better showing of black candidates in predominantly white at-large cities due at least in part "to the possibility that those cities with the most egregious previous underrepresentation of blacks were the ones most likely to be challenged in court and thus most likely to have changed from at-large systems?"[73] Welch regarded this question as open.

Is there reason to believe something like this happened? We initially thought it was a good possibility because the cities that remained at large were, in most states, only a relatively small subset of the cities that began the period at large. According to table 10.1, in five of the eight states of our study a clear majority of the at-large cities changed election type over the period in question. In a sixth state, Louisiana, the proportion of cities that shifted election type was almost exactly one-half. Only in North Carolina and Virginia did the vast bulk of cities with at-large elections at the beginning of the period still elect at large at the end. Of course, had the other state chapters included cities and towns of very small size, as

did North Carolina, then we would have most probably found that most cities in the South still elected at large.

To increase comparability across states without unnecessary sacrifice of sample size, we again focus on the cities in our data set that are above 10,000. If we confine ourselves to these cities, however, then the extent of changes in election type since the beginning of the period is even greater than for the full set of cities, although North Carolina and Virginia remain exceptions to the generalization that a clear majority of the cities that used to elect at large no longer do so.[74]

We examine the mean black equity score of the 1989–90 at-large cities of at least 10,000 at the beginning of the period, for cities grouped according to what election system they eventually adopted, and controlling for the percentage black in the cities' population.

The evidence for selection bias is easiest to see by examining the entire set of majority-white cities in tables 10.7A and 10.7B. In those sixty-seven cities which changed to single-member districts, the black equity score initially averaged only 0.09. In contrast, the seventy-two cities that retained the at-large plan began with a score of 0.31. These differences are statistically as well as substantively significant and show clear evidence of potential selection bias. The fifty cities that changed to mixed plans had an intermediate mean score of 0.23. There is also evidence of selection bias in the majority-black cities. The six adopting single-member districts had an initial mean score of 0.03; the six adopting mixed plans, 0.18; and the five remaining unchanged, 0.46. The number of majority-black cities, however, was obviously small.[75]

We now turn to a state-specific analysis to better understand some of the complexities of selection bias. The findings are seen in table 10.7A and 10.7B. In Georgia (for both population categories of majority-white cities), in Texas and Virginia (for cities 10–29.9 percent black), and in South Carolina (for cities 30–49.9 percent black), there appears to be a potential selection bias effect in the majority-white cities; minority electoral success was higher initially in the majority-white cities that remained at large than in those changing election type.[76] Thus, for half the states, the representational equity of the at-large majority-white cities might well have been lower if more of the "worst case" at-large cities had retained at-large elections.[77]

Tables 10.7A–B shows no evidence of probable selection bias in four states: Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina. But it is possible that our particular longitudinal design is not sufficient to uncover all the evidence that might exist for such bias even in these states, and may possibly underestimate the magnitude of selection bias in the four other states as well. This is because we chose, for each state, only two data points approximately fifteen years apart rather than, say, several data points throughout the period.[78]

Not only were very few southern cities using an alternative to the at-large election system in the early 1970s,[79] but in many areas of the South few cities had even begun to elect blacks to office in this period. This was fortunate for our before-and-after design, inasmuch as it meant that there would be few cases where

the change in election type had preceded our starting date, but it was unfortunate for our analysis of selection bias. The hypothesis of selection bias is premised on the assumption that some at-large cities early on became less vulnerable to voting rights litigation by virtue of having elected a substantial percentage of blacks to office, in comparison with other at-large cities. But if virtually no blacks were being elected in the "before" period, no test of the selection bias hypothesis is possible.[80]

Consider Alabama, a state that, according to the table, gives no evidence of selection bias. The authors of the Alabama chapter chose 1970 as their starting point. The three majority-white Alabama cities still electing at large—cities whose 1989 ratio equity score was 1.10—had no black representation in 1970. But black representation that year in the state's other majority-white at-large cities was also virtually nil, as table 10.7B shows. Analogous patterns of complete or nearly complete black exclusion from office in the "before" period of our study existed in Louisiana and Mississippi (and for South Carolina cities that were 10–29.9 percent black). Thus with only data for the 1970 or 1974 starting points in these states, the possibility of selection bias would appear to be nonexistent. However, bias may still be present in these states, but missed because of the lack of data points intermediate between the early 1970s and the late 1980s. Additional data collected for the Alabama chapter underscore this point.[81]

SUMMARY

Our analyses of the eight-state data set lead us to reaffirm the standard view that at-large elections have deleterious effects on black representation for cities with white majorities and a black population of at least 10 percent. As table 10.2 demonstrates, dramatic gains in black representation followed abolition of at-large elections—gains much greater than in cities that remained at large. (The negative impact of at-large elections is felt in county government too, as demonstrated in the three state chapters that examined the question.) In almost all states, table 10.3A shows, black representational equity was near 1.00 for majority-white cities using single-member districts: 1.14 for cities that were 10–29.9 percent black; 0.92 for cities that were 30–49.9 percent black; and a score only slightly above 0.50 for the majority-white cities that elected at large (0.53 for cities that were 10–29.9 percent black and 0.56 for cities that were 30–49.9 percent black).[82]

Also, as anticipated, when the black population percentage was held constant, levels of black officeholding in cities with a mixed plan were generally intermediate between those in at-large and single-member-district systems. Moreover, the data in tables 10.4 and 10.5 show a pattern of total exclusion of blacks in some states (and near exclusion in others) in the at-large component of mixed plans and in the majority-white districts in single-member district plans. Black officeholding in mixed plans was largely or almost entirely the result of black success in the districted component of the plan. Moreover, when we focus on districts in cities

that elected by district, black officeholding was practically nonexistent in council districts less than 40 percent black but—except for Mississippi—it was close to 100 percent of all officeholders in districts greater than 60 percent black.[83]

The data analysis in this chapter also allows us to account for the differences between the findings of Welch's important 1990 study and those reported for the state chapters in this volume. Welch noted sharply increased black officeholding in at-large systems by 1988.[84] Our state chapters found that with a handful of exceptions at most, black equity scores in at-large settings were still very low in 1989. We reject the interpretation some authors (but not Welch herself) have placed on her work, and we have presented evidence that the differences between Welch's results and those of the chapter authors are more apparent than real, partly because of the difference in city sizes in the two studies and partly because of the problem of selection bias that Welch's cross-sectional design could not detect.

One way to see the remarkable effect of the changes in election type described in this chapter is to focus on the number of cities that failed to elect even a single black representative. Let us confine ourselves to the cities above 10,000 in our eight-state data base. There were 206, all at large, at the start of the period, of which 141 (68 percent) had no black officeholder; by the end of the period, there were only 77 at-large cities, of which 22 (29 percent) had no black officeholder. Also at the end of the period, however, there was *no* city with a single-member district or mixed plan that failed to have at least one black officeholder. Thus, even if we assume that without a change in election type, the proportion of the 129 changed cities (206 − 77) that would have no black officeholders at the end of the period would have been 29 percent (an estimate we know from our above discussion of selection bias to be very generous), then at least 37 cities over 10,000 in the eight southern states ([.29 − 0] × 129) avoided black exclusion from politics as a result of a change in election type. Of course, this is a very conservative estimate of the consequences of cities' adopting districts, since using the current results in at-large cities as predictive of what would have happened had these cities not adopted districts understates the consequences of change in election rules. In making this estimate of the positive impact of cities' adopting district or mixed plans, we are focusing narrowly on their ability to break the barrier against the election of a single black officeholder in these cities of at least 10,000.

If we broaden our inquiry, however, to include all gains in black officeholding resulting from cities' abolishing at-large elections and if we make use of our full data set, these gains are greater still. Our question now is, how many black officeholders can we be reasonably sure owe their election to single-member district or mixed plans? These are *council members who would not have been elected had black representation in these cities remained at the same level as in the unchanged at-large cities*. We find the net effect of change in election type in 217 cities to have resulted in the election of approximately two hundred more black city council members in 1989–90, even after we control for gains that under very generous assumptions might have taken place even had these cities remained at large.[85] Moreover, because such a relatively small proportion of cities have

adopted districts in the South as a whole, there remain potential net gains of hundreds of new black council members in the many cities and towns that still remain at large, if they adopt district systems.

In summary, the longitudinal comparisons permitted by our data base and the variety of data we looked at have allowed us to gauge more accurately the extent to which shifts to single-member districts caused gains in black officeholding.[86] To recapitulate, when we combined the information in tables 10.4 and 10.5 with that shown in tables 10.2 and 10.3, it was apparent that minority underrepresentation was a persistent phenomenon in the South even as late as 1989. Moreover, when we reanalyzed the data to look for possible selection bias effects, we discovered a strong likelihood of them. Also, when we examined tables 10.6 and 10.7, we saw that even though black officeholding was relatively proportional in the handful of large southern cities that still elected at large, there were strong city size effects, such that representational equity in the at-large setting remained minuscule in small towns in some states. In these jurisdictions, especially in North Carolina and Mississippi, blacks continued to go unrepresented, and there were numerous towns that fell into this category. Had we examined at-large cities under 10,000 in Georgia, South Carolina, and Texas, we might very well have found similar underrepresentation there. These findings lead us to disagree strongly with those who dismiss the continuing importance of the Voting Rights Act as a safeguard for the right of blacks to fair representation.

TABLE 10.1
Data Base Characteristics, Cities with 10 Percent or More Black Population in 1980, Eight Southern States Covered by Section 5 of The Voting Rights Act

State	City Population Threshold	(N)[a]	Number of At-Large Cities: At Beginning of Period	Number of At-Large Cities: At End of Period	Period of Analysis
Alabama	6,000	(48)	48	6	1970–89
Georgia[b]	10,000	(34)	15	6	1980–90
Louisiana	2,500	(90)	57	29	1974–89
Mississippi	1,000	(133)	130	59	1974–89
North Carolina[c]	None	(729)	724	702	1973–89
South Carolina	10,000	(21)	21	7	1974–89
Texas[d]	10,000	(46)	42	17	1974–89
Virginia[e]	None	(26)	23	17	1977–89
TOTAL			1,060	843	

[a] The *N*s shown in parentheses in the third column are the total number of cities in a state for which any data are available. The values in the fourth column indicate the number of cities with at-large plans at the beginning of the period for which data are reported in the longitudinal data bases.

[b] In Georgia in 1990, 7 of 34 cities for which data are reported used multimember districts (see tables 3.1 and 3.2). We have omitted the multimember-district cities from the longitudinal data used in this chapter.

[c] The North Carolina data include ten cities with less than 10 percent black population but with a combined black plus Native American population of greater than 10 percent. All are under 5,000 in population; most are under 500. Six are in Robeson County. Five are majority Native American. The city of Goldsboro is identified by data provided by the city as being majority-minority, and is so characterized in Chapter 6. However, it is only 46.6 percent black, according to the U.S. census, and is not treated as majority-minority in chapter 10.

[d] In Texas, one multimember-district city is omitted from the data set. Also omitted is one for which 1974 data are unavailable and two others that did not have at-large systems in 1974. Only cities at least 10 percent black are analyzed in chapter 10, as distinct from chapter 8, where cities at least 10 percent black and Hispanic combined are analyzed.

[e] All independent cities (see chapter 9 for a definition of these cities).

TABLE 10.2A
Changes in Black Representation on Council during the Period of Investigation, Cities *10–29.9 Percent Black* in Eight Southern States

State (1980 Population Threshold)	*Change in % Black on Council*						*Difference ($t_2 - t_1$) in Black Representation*			*Changed Plans: Net Change in Black Representation*	
	From AL to SMD		*From AL to Mixed*		*AL Unchanged*		*SMD Plan*	*Mixed Plan*	*AL Plan*	*(SMD Change − AL Change)*	*(Mixed Change − AL Change)*
	t_1	t_2	t_1	t_2	t_1	t_2					
Alabama	0	20	11	11	0	20	20	0	20	0	−20
(6,000)	(23)	(23)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(3)	(23)	(1)	(3)		
Georgia	0	25	—	—	9	10	25	—	1	24	—
(10,000)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(5)	(5)	(1)	(0)	(5)		
Louisiana	0	27	3	19	0	10	27	16	10	17	6
(2,500)	(3)	(3)	(7)	(7)	(16)	(16)	(3)	(7)	(16)		
Mississippi	0	20	0	11	0	9	20	11	9	11	2
(1,000)	(5)	(5)	(16)	(16)	(20)	(20)	(5)	(16)	(20)		
N. Carolina	—	—	8	18	1	3	—	10	2	—	8
(none)	(0)	(0)	(5)	(5)	(346)	(346)	(0)	(5)	(346)		
S. Carolina	0	25	0	25	0	3	25	25	3	22	22
(10,000)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(5)	(5)	(2)	(1)	(5)		
Texas	6	27	7	19	11	14	21	12	3	18	9
(10,000)	(9)	(9)	(11)	(11)	(16)	(16)	(9)	(11)	(16)		
Virginia	0	20	5	21	8	10	20	16	2	18	14
(none)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(11)	(11)	(1)	(2)	(11)		
STATE MEAN	1	23	5	18	4	10	23	13	6	16	6
(*N*)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(8)	(8)	(7)	(7)	(8)	(7)	(7)

TABLE 10.2B
Changes in Black Representation on Council during the Period of Investigation, Cities *30–49.9 Percent Black* in Eight Southern States

State (1980 Population Threshold)	*Change in % Black on Council*						*Difference ($t_2 - t_1$) in Black Representation*			*Changed Plans: Net Change in Black Representation*	
	From AL to SMD		*From AL to Mixed*		*AL Unchanged*						
	t_1	t_2	t_1	t_2	t_1	t_2	*SMD Plan*	*Mixed Plan*	*AL Plan*	*(SMD Change − AL Change)*	*(Mixed Change − AL Change)*
Alabama	0	38	0	30	—	—	38	30	—	—	—
(6,000)	(13)	(13)	(2)	(2)	(0)	(0)	(13)	(2)	(0)		
Georgia	13	30	7	32	20	17	17	25	−3	20	28
(10,000)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(3)	(1)		
Louisiana	2	39	0	24	0	20	37	24	20	17	4
(2,500)	(9)	(9)	(6)	(6)	(7)	(7)	(9)	(6)	(7)		
Mississippi	0	36	0	30	0	9	36	30	9	27	21
(1,000)	(14)	(14)	(13)	(13)	(15)	(15)	(14)	(13)	(15)		
N. Carolina	5	36	11	32	1	5	31	21	4	27	17
(none)	(6)	(6)	(7)	(7)	(216)	(216)	(6)	(7)	(216)		
S. Carolina	2	45	4	33	8	15	43	29	7	36	22
(10,000)	(7)	(7)	(4)	(4)	(2)	(2)	(7)	(4)	(2)		
Texas	0	37	21	42	0	50	37	21	50	−13	−29
(10,000)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(2)	(1)		
Virginia	—	—	10	33	15	29	—	23	14	—	9
(none)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(6)	(6)	(0)	(1)	(6)		
STATE MEAN	3	37	7	32	6	21 [16][a]	34	25	14 [9][a]	19 [25][a]	10 [15][a]
(*N*)	(7)	(7)	(8)	(8)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(8)	(7)	(6)	(7)

[a] The numbers in brackets show what happens when the one unchanged at-large Texas city in the 30–49.9 percent black is excluded. This is the city, as explained in the text, that had a majority-white population in 1980 but that was majority black by 1990.

TABLE 10.2C
Changes in Black Representation on Council during the Period of Investigation, Cities *50–100 Percent Black* in Eight Southern States

State (1980 Population Threshold)	*Change in % Black on Council*						*Difference ($t_2 - t_1$) in Black Representation*			*Changed Plans: Net Change in Black Representation*	
	From AL to SMD		*From AL to Mixed*		*AL Unchanged*		*SMD Plan*	*Mixed Plan*	*AL Plan*	*(SMD Change − AL Change)*	*(Mixed Change − AL Change)*
	t_1	t_2	t_1	t_2	t_1	t_2					
Alabama	0	80	0	51	46	74	80	51	28	52	23
(6,000)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)		
Georgia	—	—	23	35	—	—	—	12	—	—	—
(10,000)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(2)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(0)		
Louisiana	0	50	0	25	27	53	50	25	26	24	−1
(2,500)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(6)	(6)	(2)	(1)	(6)		
Mississippi	0	43	5	37	23	49	43	32	26	17	6
(1,000)	(11)	(11)	(12)	(12)	(24)	(24)	(11)	(12)	(24)		
N. Carolina	6	48	0	40	2	9	42	40	7	35	33
(none)	(3)	(3)	(1)	(1)	(140)	(140)	(3)	(1)	(140)		
S. Carolina	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(10,000)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)		
Texas	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(10,000)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)		
Virginia	11	56	20	50	—	—	45	30	—	—	—
(none)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(0)		
STATE MEAN	3	55	8	40	24	46	53	32	22	33	15
(*N*)	(5)	(5)	(6)	(6)	(4)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(4)	(4)	(4)

TABLE 10.3A

Black Representation on Council *at the End of the Period* of Investigation, Cities at Least 10 Percent Black in 1980 that Began the Period with an At-Large Plan, Eight Southern States (Ratio Equity Scores)

% Black in City Population by Type of Plan at End of Period	*Mean Ratio Equity Score for Cities*								
	Ala.	*Ga.*	*La.*	*Miss.*	*N.C.*	*S.C.*	*Tex.*	*Va.*	*State Mean*
10–29.9									
SMD	1.10	0.89	1.04	0.84	—	1.34	1.20	1.54	1.14
(*N*)	(23)	(1)	(3)	(5)	(0)	(2)	(9)	(1)	(7)
Mixed	0.69	—	0.83	0.58	0.82	0.85	1.11	1.05	0.85
(*N*)	(1)	(0)	(7)	(16)	(5)	(1)	(11)	(2)	(7)
At-large	1.10	0.47	0.60	0.41	0.14	0.21	0.75	0.56	0.53
(*N*)	(3)	(5)	(16)	(20)	(346)	(5)	(16)	(11)	(8)
30–49.9									
SMD	1.03	0.68	0.90	0.85	0.89	1.08	1.04	—	0.92
(*N*)	(13)	(3)	(9)	(14)	(6)	(7)	(3)	(0)	(7)
Mixed	0.78	0.83	0.65	0.74	0.96	0.82	1.07	0.95	0.85
(*N*)	(2)	(3)	(6)	(13)	(7)	(4)	(2)	(1)	(8)
At-large	—	0.41	0.52	0.26	0.14	0.42	1.37	0.83	0.56
(*N*)	(0)	(1)	(7)	(15)	(216)	(2)	(1)	(6)	(7)
50–100									
SMD	1.08	—	0.80	0.74	0.87	—	—	1.10	0.92
(*N*)	(1)	(0)	(2)	(11)	(3)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(5)
Mixed	0.98	0.66	0.49	0.59	0.52	—	—	0.91	0.69
(*N*)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(12)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(6)
At-large	1.09	—	0.80	0.70	0.14	—	—	—	0.68
(*N*)	(3)	(0)	(6)	(24)	(140)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(4)

TABLE 10.3B
Black Representation on Council *at the Beginning of the Period* of Investigation, Cities at Least 10 Percent Black in 1980 that Began the Period with an At-Large Plan, Eight Southern States (Ratio Equity Scores)

% Black in City Population by Type of Plan at End of Period	*Mean Ratio Equity Score for Cities*								
	Ala.	*Ga.*	*La.*	*Miss.*	*N.C.*	*S.C.*	*Tex.*	*Va.*	*State Mean*
10–29.9									
SMD	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	—	0.00	0.26	0.00	0.04
(*N*)	(23)	(1)	(3)	(5)	(0)	(2)	(9)	(1)	(7)
Mixed	0.11	—	0.11	0.00	0.38	0.00	0.36	0.25	0.17
(*N*)	(1)	(0)	(7)	(16)	(5)	(1)	(11)	(2)	(7)
At-large	0.00	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.57	0.44	0.18
(*N*)	(3)	(5)	(16)	(20)	(346)	(5)	(16)	(11)	(8)
30–49.9									
SMD	0.00	0.30	0.04	0.00	0.12	0.05	0.00	—	0.07
(*N*)	(13)	(3)	(9)	(14)	(6)	(7)	(3)	(0)	(7)
Mixed	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.10	0.55	0.25	0.17
(*N*)	(2)	(3)	(6)	(13)	(7)	(4)	(2)	(1)	(8)
At-large	—	0.49	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.22	0.00	0.43	0.17
(*N*)	(0)	(1)	(7)	(15)	(216)	(2)	(1)	(6)	(7)
50–100									
SMD	0.00	—	0.00	0.00	0.10	—	—	0.22	0.06
(*N*)	(1)	(0)	(2)	(11)	(3)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(5)
Mixed	0.00	0.42	0.00	0.07	0.00	—	—	0.36	0.14
(*N*)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(12)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(6)
At-large	0.46	—	0.33	0.32	0.03	—	—	—	0.28
(*N*)	(3)	(0)	(6)	(24)	(140)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(4)

TABLE 10.4

Black Council Representation in Mixed Plans at the End of the Period of Investigation by District and At-Large Components, Cities at Least 10 Percent Black, Eight Southern States

	Mean % Black Councilpersons in Each Type of Component																	
% Black in City	*Ala.*		*Ga.*		*La.*		*Miss.*		*N.C.*		*S.C.*		*Tex.*		*Va.*		*State Mean*	
Population, 1980	*Dist.*	*AL*	*Dist.*	*AL*	*Dist.*	*AL*	*Dist.*	*AL*	*Dist.*	*AL*	*Dist.*	*AL*	*Dist.*	*AL*	*Dist.*	*AL*	*Dist.*	*AL*
10–29.9	13	0	—	—	31	0	15	0	31	0	33	0	14	2	23	13	23	2
(*N*)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(13)	(13)	(18)	(18)	(5)	(5)	(1)	(1)	(11)	(11)	(3)	(3)	(7)	(7)
30–49.9	42	0	42	12	31	7	37	0	36	3	53	0	25	10	58	0	41	4
(*N*)	(2)	(2)	(9)	(9)	(13)	(13)	(13)	(13)	(8)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(8)	(8)
50–100	59	0	45	39	51	38	46	25	50	0	—	—	—	—	50	0	50	17
(*N*)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(4)	(12)	(12)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(6)	(6)

TABLE 10.5
Black Representation on Council Single-Member Districts at the End of the Period of Investigation, by Black Population in District, Single-Member-District and Mixed Cities at Least 10 Percent Black, Eight Southern States[a]

% Black Population in District	*Mean % Black Councilpersons in District*								
	Ala.	*Ga.*	*La.*	*Miss.*	*N.C.*	*S.C.*	*Tex.*	*Va.*	*State Mean*
0–9.9	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	NA	1
(*N*)	(94)	(9)	(37)	(44)	(8)	(23)	(24)		(7)
10–19.9	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA	0
(*N*)	(37)	(11)	(10)	(27)	(11)	(15)	(12)		(7)
20–29.9	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	NA	1
(*N*)	(8)	(3)	(12)	(13)	(10)	(4)	(2)		(7)
30–39.9	0	33	0	0	25	0	17	NA	11
(*N*)	(4)	(3)	(9)	(14)	(8)	(3)	(6)		(7)
40–49.9	50	—	40	0	0	—	—	NA	23
(*N*)	(4)	(0)	(5)	(12)	(2)	(0)	(0)		(4)
50–59.9	—	67	50	27	100	75	100	100	74
(*N*)	(0)	(6)	(4)	(11)	(8)	(4)	(2)	(3)	(7)
60–69.9	100	100	100	48	75	100	83	75	85
(*N*)	(20)	(2)	(7)	(21)	(4)	(15)	(6)	(4)	(8)
70–79.9	100	—	100	82	100	83	83	100	93
(*N*)	(16)	(0)	(8)	(11)	(6)	(12)	(6)	(5)	(7)
80–89.9	100	100	100	93	100	100	100	100	99
(*N*)	(11)	(5)	(8)	(15)	(6)	(1)	(4)	(2)	(8)
90–100	100	100	100	100	100	—	—	100	100
(*N*)	(7)	(3)	(14)	(27)	(5)	(0)	(0)	(6)	(6)

[a]The percentage black categories in this table are more numerous than in some of the state chapters. Also, Texas data in this table, as compared with Texas data in the state chapter, are for cities at least 10 percent black rather than black and Hispanic combined. North Carolina data are reported only for cities with a population of at least 10,000. The *N*s in this table may differ slightly from those in the state chapters because data are included here only for cities for which the data set is complete.

TABLE 10.6A
Changes in Black Representation on Council during the Period of Investigation, Cities of 10,000 or More Population in 1980, *10–29.9 Percent Black*, in Eight Southern States

	Change in % Black on Council						*Difference ($t_2 - t_1$) in Black Representation*			*Changed Plans: Net Change in Black Representation*	
	From AL to SMD		*From AL to Mixed*		*AL Unchanged*						
State	t_1	t_2	t_1	t_2	t_1	t_2	*SMD Plan*	*Mixed Plan*	*AL Plan*	*(SMD Change − AL Change)*	*(Mixed Change − AL Change)*
Alabama	0	21	11	11	0	20	21	0	20	1	−20
(*N*)	(13)	(13)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(3)	(13)	(1)	(3)		
Georgia	0	25	—	—	9	10	25	—	1	24	—
(*N*)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(5)	(5)	(1)	(0)	(5)		
Louisiana	0	17	4	18	0	0	17	14	0	17	14
(*N*)	(2)	(2)	(5)	(5)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(5)	(3)		
Mississippi	0	17	0	14	0	10	17	14	10	7	4
(*N*)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(2)		
N. Carolina	—	—	8	17	4	9	—	9	5	—	4
(*N*)	(0)	(0)	(3)	(3)	(14)	(14)	(0)	(3)	(14)		
S. Carolina	0	25	0	25	0	3	25	25	3	22	22
(*N*)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(5)	(5)	(2)	(1)	(5)		
Texas	6	27	7	19	11	14	21	12	3	18	9
(*N*)	(9)	(9)	(11)	(11)	(16)	(16)	(9)	(11)	(16)		
Virginia	—	—	5	21	10	13	—	16	3	—	13
(*N*)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(2)	(7)	(7)	(0)	(2)	(7)		
CITY MEAN	0	23	5	18	6	11	22	14	6	16	8
(*N*)	(29)	(29)	(26)	(26)	(55)	(55)	(29)	(26)	(55)		
STATE MEAN	1	22	5	18	4	10	21	13	6	15	7
(*N*)	(6)	(6)	(7)	(7)	(8)	(8)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(6)	(7)

TABLE 10.6B
Changes in Black Representation on Council during the Period of Investigation, Cities of 10,000 or More Population in 1980, *30–49.9 Percent Black*, in Eight Southern States

	Change in % Black on Council						*Difference ($t_2 - t_1$) in Black Representation*			*Changed Plans: Net Change in Black Representation*	
	From AL to SMD		*From AL to Mixed*		*AL Unchanged*						
State	t_1	t_2	t_1	t_2	t_1	t_2	*SMD Plan*	*Mixed Plan*	*AL Plan*	*(SMD Change − AL Change)*	*(Mixed Change − AL Change)*
Alabama	0	41	0	30	—	—	41	30	—	—	—
(*N*)	(7)	(7)	(2)	(2)	(0)	(0)	(7)	(2)	(0)		
Georgia	13	30	7	32	20	17	17	25	−3	20	28
(*N*)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(3)	(1)		
Louisiana	0	41	0	35	15	43	41	35	28	13	7
(*N*)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(1)	(1)	(4)	(4)	(1)		
Mississippi	0	39	0	43	—	—	39	43	—	—	—
(*N*)	(8)	(8)	(2)	(2)	(0)	(0)	(8)	(2)	(0)		
N. Carolina	18	47	18	33	11	32	29	15	21	8	−6
(*N*)	(6)	(6)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(6)	(7)	(7)		
S. Carolina	2	45	4	33	8	15	43	29	7	36	22
(*N*)	(7)	(7)	(4)	(4)	(2)	(2)	(7)	(4)	(2)		
Texas	0	37	21	42	0	50	37	21	50	−13	−29
(*N*)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(2)	(1)		
Virginia	—	—	—	—	15	27	—	—	12	—	—
(*N*)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(5)	(5)	(0)	(0)	(5)		
CITY MEAN	4	41	9	35	12	29	35	26	17	18	9
(*N*)	(38)	(38)	(24)	(24)	(17)	(17)	(38)	(24)	(17)	(79)	(79)
STATE MEAN	5	40	7	35	12	31	35	28	19	13	4
(*N*)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(6)	(6)	(7)	(7)	(6)	(5)	(5)

TABLE 10.6C
Changes in Black Representation on Council during the Period of Investigation, Cities of 10,000 or More Population in 1980, *50–100 Percent Black*, in Eight Southern States

	Change in % Black on Council						*Difference ($t_2 - t_1$) in Black Representation*			*Changed Plans: Net Change in Black Representation*	
	From AL to SMD		*From AL to Mixed*		*AL Unchanged*						
State	t_1	t_2	t_1	t_2	t_1	t_2	*SMD Plan*	*Mixed Plan*	*AL Plan*	*(SMD Change − AL Change)*	*(Mixed Change − AL Change)*
Alabama	0	80	0	51	46	74	80	51	28	52	23
(*N*)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)		
Georgia	—	—	23	35	—	—	—	12	—	—	—
(*N*)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(2)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(0)		
Louisiana	0	60	—	—	—	—	60	—	—	—	—
(*N*)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(0)	(0)		
Mississippi	0	48	7	50	0	17	48	43	17	31	26
(*N*)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(2)	(1)		
N. Carolina	—	—	—	—	20	60	—	—	40	—	—
(*N*)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(1)		
S. Carolina	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(*N*)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)		
Texas	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(*N*)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)		
Virginia	11	56	—	—	—	—	45	—	—	—	—
(*N*)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(0)	(0)		
CITY MEAN	2	57	10	45	32	60	55	35	28	27	7
(*N*)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(5)	(5)	(6)	(6)	(5)	(17)	(17)
STATE MEAN	3	61	10	45	22	50	58	35	28	42	25
(*N*)	(4)	(4)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(2)

TABLE 10.7A

Black Representation on Council *at the End of the Period* of Investigation, Cities of 10,000 or More Population in 1980 at Least 10 Percent Black in 1980 that Began Period with an At-Large Plan, Eight Southern States (Ratio Equity Scores)

% Black in City Population by Type of Plan at End of Period	*Mean Ratio Equity Score for Cities*									
	Ala.	*Ga.*	*La.*	*Miss.*	*N.C.*	*S.C.*	*Tex.*	*Va.*	*City Mean*	*State Mean*
10–29.9										
SMD	1.06	0.89	0.65	0.80	—	1.34	1.20	—	1.07	0.99
(*N*)	(13)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(0)	(2)	(9)	(0)	(29)	(6)
Mixed	0.69	—	0.87	0.78	0.77	0.85	1.11	1.00	0.95	0.87
(*N*)	(1)	(0)	(5)	(3)	(3)	(1)	(11)	(2)	(26)	(7)
At-large	1.10	0.47	0.00	0.58	0.51	0.21	0.75	0.64	0.57	0.53
(*N*)	(3)	(5)	(3)	(2)	(14)	(5)	(16)	(7)	(55)	(8)
30–49.9										
SMD	1.16	0.68	0.94	0.95	1.11	1.08	1.04	—	1.03	0.99
(*N*)	(7)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(6)	(7)	(3)	(0)	(38)	(7)
Mixed	0.78	0.83	0.91	1.08	0.95	0.82	1.07	—	0.92	0.92
(*N*)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(7)	(4)	(2)	(0)	(24)	(7)
At-large	—	0.41	1.13	—	0.82	0.42	1.37	0.76	0.78	0.82
(*N*)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(7)	(2)	(1)	(5)	(17)	(6)
50–100										
SMD	1.08	—	0.86	0.86	—	—	—	1.10	0.93	0.97
(*N*)	(1)	(0)	(1)	(3)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(6)	(4)
Mixed	0.98	0.66	—	0.76	—	—	—	—	0.80	0.80
(*N*)	(2)	(2)	(0)	(2)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(6)	(3)
At-large	1.09	—	—	0.28	1.14	—	—	—	0.94	0.84
(*N*)	(3)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(5)	(3)

TABLE 10.7B

Black Representation on Council *at the Beginning of the Period* of Investigation, Cities of 10,000 or More Population in 1980 at Least 10 Percent Black in 1980 that Began Period with an At-Large Plan, Eight Southern States (Ratio Equity Scores)

% Black in City Population by Type of Plan at End of Period	*Mean Ratio Equity Score for Cities*									
	Ala.	*Ga.*	*La.*	*Miss.*	*N.C.*	*S.C.*	*Tex.*	*Va.*	*City Mean*	*State Mean*
10–29.9										
SMD	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	—	0.00	0.26	—	0.08	0.04
(*N*)	(13)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(0)	(2)	(9)	(0)	(29)	(6)
Mixed	0.69	—	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.00	0.36	0.22	0.23	0.22
(*N*)	(1)	(0)	(5)	(3)	(3)	(1)	(11)	(2)	(26)	(7)
At-large	0.00	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.57	0.42	0.31	0.20
(*N*)	(3)	(5)	(3)	(2)	(14)	(5)	(16)	(7)	(55)	(8)
30–49.9										
SMD	0.00	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.43	0.05	0.00	—	0.10	0.11
(*N*)	(7)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(6)	(7)	(3)	(0)	(38)	(7)
Mixed	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.51	0.10	0.55	—	0.23	0.19
(*N*)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(7)	(4)	(2)	(0)	(24)	(7)
At-large	—	0.49	0.00	—	0.29	0.22	0.00	0.43	0.30	0.24
(*N*)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(7)	(2)	(1)	(5)	(17)	(6)
50–100										
SMD	0.00	—	0.00	0.00	—	—	—	0.22	0.03	0.06
(*N*)	(1)	(0)	(1)	(3)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(6)	(4)
Mixed	0.00	0.42	—	0.11	—	—	—	—	0.18	0.18
(*N*)	(2)	(2)	(0)	(2)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(6)	(3)
At-large	0.64	—	—	0.00	0.38	—	—	—	0.46	0.34
(*N*)	(3)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(5)	(3)