

"It is well that there has been in the world some good and some bad; without that, one would be driven to leave this life."

The bulk of the book examines *The Spirit of the Laws*. Books XIV-XXXI are discussed first in order to proceed from nonpolitical to political. Since Merry contends that Montesquieu believes the latter does and must reflect the former, he treats the subpolitical first in order that politics may be better understood. He argues that Montesquieu seeks to establish the independence of economics, religion, and civil law from politics and political law in order to unleash the activity stimulated by greed and checked by fear of God, and to replace natural by civil law as the standard of political law.

Read in the light of Montesquieu's treatment of nonpolitical things, books II-X, which have traditionally been regarded as a discussion of forms of government, are interpreted to be an examination of the capabilities, roles, and relations of the three main social classes. Their purpose is to show the need for and foundation of a mixed government that reflects social forces and does not require austere virtues.

The final three chapters, which discuss the books on liberty (XI-XIII), seek to show that both civil and political liberties are primarily nurtured and secured by the proper distribution of political authority among the three social classes rather than by legal separation of powers. Professor Merry finds that the famous discussion of the English Constitution is not central to *The Spirit of the Laws*, but deals with only one kind of political liberty and that not the most important. Furthermore, Montesquieu's natural government cannot be understood, and is distorted, by looking at its end of liberty. A spirit of moderation is more to be sought by mixed government than even liberty.

Professor Merry's book is best when it is closest to Montesquieu. He reminds us of the breadth and subtlety of Montesquieu, and gives us the fruits of reflective hours spent in the baron's company in many provocative interpretations. He has an easy time in rescuing Montesquieu from legalistic Americans, though one might wonder whether there was not some truth in the old prejudice. For if the ends of government are given, is there a more important question than how these ends are achieved? It is true that Montesquieu writes about the spirit, but it is the spirit of the laws.

Merry would have Montesquieu read in our times by showing that he speaks like our times. The use of social science terminology confuses the interpretation and makes Merry say less than he knows. For example, to say that moderation is higher than liberty in Montesquieu's value hierarchy is to neglect the fact that neither moderation nor liberty is a value for Montesquieu, but one a

spirit and the other an end of the laws. This confusion prevents Merry from clearly raising and adequately answering the question whose general form might be, "Why does Montesquieu write about the spirit of the laws rather than the end of law?" To say that Montesquieu values the spirit more than the end is no answer.

One is tempted to suggest that Montesquieu should be read in the light of what preceded him rather than in that which followed. The character of the mixed government admired by Montesquieu is never clarified by Merry as it could have been had he compared it to the mixed regime of Aristotle. The opening discussion of the nature of man would have been less a mere collection of opinions had he sharpened the issues by, say, reflecting on the previously quoted remark in the light cast by the *Politics*. Furthermore, the warrant for such comparisons would be Montesquieu's own, as it is he who uses the traditional terminology to change it.

Finally Merry's procedure hides from us the most important lessons of Montesquieu. Montesquieu proceeds from the old classification of governments to the new. In discussing Montesquieu, Merry proceeds from the new sociology and finds the old classification irrelevant. Accepting Merry's interpretation of the character of the new political science, one might wonder whether Montesquieu's order does not indicate that political philosophy leads to sociology, where Merry's order seeks but to reveal Montesquieu as a political sociologist. In portraying Montesquieu as a sociologist, Merry nearly forgets that he was a philosopher. By neglecting the possibility that Montesquieu does not merely present a system, but that he gives the reasons for doing what we now do out of habit, Merry downplays precisely that element of Montesquieu from which our times might learn the most.—GLEN THURLOW, *State University of New York at Buffalo*.

*Robert's Rules of Order. (New Revised).* BY HENRY M. ROBERT, SARAH CORBIN ROBERT, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF HENRY M. ROBERT III, JAMES W. CLEARY, AND WILLIAM J. EVANS. Glenview, Illinois. Scott Foresman and Co. Pp. 550. 1970.

If it is natural for Americans, at least middle and upper class ones, to join voluntary organizations; it is almost as natural for those organizations to run, at least in principle, in accord with parliamentary procedure. While hundreds of manuals of parliamentary procedure have been published over the years, of which well over a dozen are currently in print; there remains only one *Robert's Rules of Order*. For almost a century, ever since it replaced *Cushing's Manual of Parliamentary Practice* (1844) as the basic parliamentary reference work, to virtually all Americans *Robert's*

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*Rules* is parliamentary procedure and using any other manual would be sacrilege. Indeed, it has been seriously suggested that only the Bible has had a greater influence on the organizational behavior of Americans. Almost three million copies of *Robert's* various editions have been sold since 1876, which has made it one of the all-time nonfiction best-sellers.

Although General Henry M. Robert has been dead for nearly half-a-century, *Robert's Rules of Order* lives on; and within its pages the ideas of the long-dead general are perpetuated. The present edition, edited by the General's daughter-in-law with the assistance of several others including the General's grandson, is the first complete revision since 1915 and the first new edition in nearly twenty years; but there is nothing in it that would be new to General Robert. It supersedes previous editions, but has been written to be "in complete harmony" with them. Nonetheless, in the words of its inside front cover dustjacket, this edition is "more modern, more complete, more comprehensive; better organized, more clearly presented, more efficient, and FAR EASIER TO USE than any earlier edition," a description with which I am in complete accord.

*Robert's Newly Revised* is several hundred pages thicker than the 75th Anniversary Edition which it replaces. It incorporates material from General Robert's earlier works, *Parliamentary Practice* and *Parliamentary Law*, so as to provide for the first time answers to various esoteric questions of procedure in one definitive reference work. Earlier editions of *Robert's Rules* had charts which were impossible to use, with stars, asterisks, footnotes, and fine print enough to confuse even an experienced parliamentarian. This new edition has a forty-eight page center section of charts and tables, readily set off by a different color and heavier stock paper, which is an absolute delight to use for the student seeking quick reference as to form, precedence, and applicability of motions. This new edition also has the pleasant distinction of being reasonably well written and exceptionally well organized. Logical arrangement of material has replaced the old paragraph format and the order of presentation has been designed to be in accord with the natural flow of business at meetings. The ambiguous classification of certain motions has been remedied and the basic classification scheme clearly explained. For each motion, a section in outline form clearly and succinctly sets forth the motion's basic operational characteristics and its uses. All in all, the new edition is far superior to any of its predecessors.

*Robert's Rules* has an importance to the social scientist which goes well beyond its possible immediate relevance to him as a concerned participant in various group decision processes. Parlia-

mentary procedure, especially that distillation of it which has entered into parliamentary law—those common principles of procedure which are held by the courts to be the applicable to every organization as being essential to legal action or for the protection of members in their individual rights—has been important in shaping and refining basic American notions of due process and majority and minority rights as applied to group activity. Indeed, *Robert's Rules* has been cited as authoritative in a number of court cases. More generally, however, *Robert's Rules* may be regarded as an implicit theory of democracy. For many Americans its procedures are synonymous with practical democracy. In fact, the inside jacket cover calls *Robert's* the "book you will want . . . the book you will need, to help get things done in accord with the American spirit (emphasis mine)." Contrasting the procedures in *Robert's* with those practiced by Quakers and with the Quaker inspired "participatory democracy" procedures of the New Left reveals quite different priorities assigned by each to values such as speed of deliberation, unanimity, intensity of preference v. majority rule, mass participation, etc.—raising questions which should be of great interest to any student of democratic theory. *Robert's Rules* is also important to the student of public policy concerned with the impact of rules on outcomes, and is, of course, particularly relevant to the student of legislative behavior. Finally, for the mathematically oriented political scientist, *Robert's Rules* offers for study a remarkable and fascinating system of queuing rules.

In an era where faculty meetings, student-faculty meetings, and mass meetings abound, we do not wish to neglect consideration of *Robert's* as a guide to the parliamentarily perplexed. It is possible for someone to learn parliamentary procedure by reading *Robert's Rules of Order* from cover to cover, but we would certainly not recommend it.\* Despite the stated intentions of the editors of this edition to combine in it a definitive reference work and a teaching manual, it is only the former which has been achieved; although this edition is

\* To learn the basics of parliamentary procedure we would recommend Alice F. Sturgis, *Learning Parliamentary Procedure*, McGraw-Hill, 1953. Her *Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure* is also excellent.

far superior to its predecessors in its accessibility to the parliamentarily uninitiated. Despite vast improvements in organization and in prose style, *Robert's Newly Revised* is, like its predecessors, marred by an archaic terminology (e.g., previous question, lay on the table), some unnecessarily complex and confusing rules (e.g., reconsider, committee of the whole v. informal consideration), and some rules which could best be dispensed with (e.g., move to reconsider and enter on the min-

utes, object to consideration) which fealty to the dead General Robert and a desire to maintain terminological accord with the U.S. House of Representatives have unfortunately frozen into place. While this new edition is a vast improvement in so many ways, it is also a great disappointment to those who had looked for a genuine revision and modernization of American parliamentary practice. For example, the discussion of procedures which could be adopted in either very small or very large gatherings when ordinary parliamentary procedure becomes unduly cumbersome (either because it is too formal or because it becomes bogged down in the weight of large numbers of participants) is woefully inadequate, despite a considerable improvement in the section on mass meetings; and in general we found some lack of sensitivity to the need to vary procedures in accord with the size and nature of the group. Also, the section on voting procedures reveals no knowledge of recent work on committee election procedures, such as that of Duncan Black, which is highly relevant to a consideration of selection of an appropriate and fair voting procedure. Regardless, however, of its shortcomings, *Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised* is definitely a book with which most political scientists should become acquainted.—BERNARD N. GROFMAN, *State University of New York, Stony Brook*.

*The Origins of Socialism*. BY GEORGE LICHTHEIM.  
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 302.  
\$6.95.)

The purpose of Professor Lichtheim's book is not merely what it seems to be. The purpose is to "clarify the origins of socialism, both as a worldview and as the specific response of workers and intellectuals to the twofold upheaval of the French Revolution and the industrial revolution." (p. vii) This is achieved by presenting socialism as originating in French and English thought but receiving its "classical formulation" in Marx "with the help of German philosophy." This theme explains the tripartite division of the book, entitled respectively "Heirs of the French Revolution," "Critics of the Industrial Revolution," and "German Socialism." The author himself, however, renders this explanation questionable. Although "socialism's greatest thinker" did his "real theoretical work as an economist" after 1848, "technical reasons" forced concluding the book with that date. This strange omission suggests that the "technical reasons" in question are of more than passing importance.

Even without this problem, the book's structure is "peculiar and somewhat daunting" since "German Socialism" is not congruent with the other titles. His explanation: the book was originally intended as "the opening section of a general history

of socialism and communism." The author does not say why its structure was not properly justified, since that would require changing only a title. This omission raises the question why broaches the structure at all? And why is it a problem relevant to the reviewer? The answer has to do with what the reviewer understands to be a conclusion reached by the author in the course of his "general history."

"sons" forced concluding the book with that date. Although there are no further statements as to why the original plan was not completed, there is another reference to "technical points" (p. v). These have "for the most part" (i.e. not completely) been relegated to the Notes. The suggestion that the Notes have some unusual relevance is supported by the author (p. ix): "The discerning reader who takes the trouble to consult Notes. . ." However, the Notes' dimensions have "been swelled by the attempt to cite as many sources as possible." This reason explains neither their size nor their importance for the "discerning reader."

What does the author mean by such peculiarities explained by weak reasons? He disclaims any intention beyond the obvious one of providing the student with a concise analysis of the subject as a critical introduction to the literature" (p. v). But "the discerning reader," not "the student" is told to consult the Notes. The discerning reader notices the proportion (1:3) between Notes and text. The number 3 recalls the "peculiar and somewhat daunting" external arrangement. Part 3 receives its peculiar attention especially since the author said (p. 98) Part 3 is "The Marxian Synthesis" rather than "German Socialism."

"The Marxian Synthesis" asks whether the threshold of our concluding chapter coincides with "the summit of our theme?" The answer "depends on what one expects from an annual account of socialist origins." The answer never becomes explicit. But we can glean an answer which explains the "technical reasons" which puzzle this reviewer.

The original theme must be qualified. Marx was not merely a socialist writer who "combined German philosophy with British economics and French socialism." He was a philosopher essentially concerned with "the genesis and function of modern society." By 1848 Marx transcended socialism as such. This synthesis may "continue to be of importance to the historian of philosophy long after socialism has taken its place, with liberalism and conservatism, as one particular reaction to the twofold upheaval of the industrial revolution and the French Revolution." And he did what Marx abandoned philosophy.

I suggest the major technical reason for ending this study with 1848 is the author's conclusion