

1997 forthcoming in Grofman, Bernard, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler,
Brian Woodall, Eds. Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single
Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution

Introduction

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Sparked in part by such seminal works as Rae (1967, 1971) as well as more recent work such as Lijphart (1984), and Taagepera (1986) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989), there has been a remarkable resurgence of interest in recent decades in the effects of electoral laws on other aspects of politics such as party competition.¹ A number of generalizations are suggested by this recent work, including the following propositions:

(1) Changes from one type of election system to another can have significant and lasting direct consequences for party proliferation (Riker, 1982; Duverger, 1984; Shugart, 1992; Blais and Carty, 1991; cf. Taagepera and Grofman, 1985), proportionality of party representation (Rae, 1967, 1971; Yamakawa, 1984; Taagepera and Shugart, 1986, 1989; Shugart, 1992; Lijphart et al., 1992 Cox, 1996 forthcoming), racial representation (Karnig and Welch, 1982; Grofman, Migalski and Noviello, 1986; Davidson and Grofman, 1994; Grofman and Davidson, 1994), within-party and cross-party competition and collusion (Sawyer and MacRae, 1968; Brams, 1975; Katz, 1980; Cox, 1987a, Cox and Rosenbluth, 1994; Ames, 1995), voter turnout (Blais and Carty, 1990), structure of ideological representation (Downs, 1957; Cox, 1990; Greenberg and Weber, 1985; Myerson and Weber 1993; Robertson, 1976; Sugden, 1984)²; incentives to cultivate a personal vote through particularistic appeals (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Carey and Shugart, 1995 forthcoming; Myerson, 1993a,b). Moreover, through effects on the numbers of parties and/or on the structure of ideological representation and/or on within-party and cross-party competition, change of election systems can have indirect effects on other important

(6) The geographic distribution of partisan support is a key intermediating factor that shapes the extent to which electoral institutions (or change in them) affects outcomes, especially electoral fairness in the translation of votes into seats (Gudgin and Taylor, 1980, Taylor, Gudgin and Johnston, 1986).

The focus of this volume is on the uses of and consequences of the single non-transferable vote (SNTV). SNTV permits voters only one vote, although there are m seats to be filled ($m > 1$); the m candidates with the highest vote totals are elected. SNTV is usually referred to as a semi-proportional election system, although in practice it tends to be quite proportional in translating votes into seats.⁸ If there are m seats to be filled in a given multimember district, under SNTV, any bloc with at least $1 / (m + 1)$ fraction of the vote can be assured of electing at least one representative if it coordinates the votes of its supporters (Grofman, 1975).

Most of the chapters deal with SNTV elections and campaigns in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. In addition, the last essay in the volume includes a brief discussion about the consequences of SNTV elections in a site seemingly as dissimilar to these countries as one could find, the state of Alabama⁹; while the three essays in the next to last section of the volume look at comparisons of SNTV with electoral systems such as the single transferable vote (STV) that have key elements in common with SNTV.

We see this volume as making several contributions. It contains a set of interrelated essays by leading scholars that look at electoral systems and their effects in three important settings that have never previously been studied within the same comparative framework: Japan, Korea and

aspects of politics such as cabinet durability (Dodd, 1976; Grofman, 1989; Lijphart, 1984).³

(2) Electoral rules that appear identical may significantly differ in their consequences when we consider variations such as in the average number of representatives elected per district (Sartori, 1968; Taagepera and Shugart, 1986) or in national vote thresholds (Reynolds and Grofman, 1992), or in even more fine-grain features such as rules restricting campaigning or rules that affect how easy it is for independent candidates to run.⁴

(3) Changes in election systems cannot be understood as operating in a vacuum. The effects of such changes are mediated by other aspects of political institutions and political culture,⁵ as well as past history. Thus, seemingly identical electoral rules may give rise to very different types of outcomes in different political settings. Moreover, electoral institutions have ramifications that extend beyond the immediate electoral arena. Thus, there can be a synergistic interaction between institutions and actors (Woodall, 1996: 141-142).⁶

(4) The full effects of electoral systems may not occur immediately, since it may take time for key actors to realize the nature of the behaviors that constitute optimizing strategies in the new system (Reed, 1992).⁷

(5) Changes in election systems may give rise to equilibrating forces that moderate the consequences of the changes as voters, candidates and parties adapt their behavior to the new institutional environment in ways that compensate for the changes, so as to partially restore significant elements of the status quo ante (Shugart, 1992; Christensen and Johnson, 1995).

Taiwan. The various essays in toto cover many aspects of electoral system impact beyond the proportionality of seats-votes relationships or effects on party proliferation or cabinet stability that have been the central focus of most previous electoral impact studies. Also, while a great deal has recently been written about elections in Japan,¹⁰ the recent democratization efforts in Korea and Taiwan make it especially timely for a volume to appear that discusses electoral system effects in these countries.¹¹ Moreover, in looking at these three countries, this volume moves away from the highly Eurocentric/British Commonwealth focus of most previous comparative studies of electoral systems. Thus, we see this book as a contribution to the field of comparative electoral studies, on the one hand, and to the study of parties and politics in three important Asian nations, on the other. Even if the book's impact did not extend beyond these two areas, we would regard its contributions to these areas as more than sufficient to justify the considerable time and effort that has gone into coordinating this multi-author effort.

But the volume's contribution to scholarship is also intended to go beyond the points enumerated above, to provide a model (we do not claim it to be a perfect one) for the multi-author collaborative study of an important political mechanism -- in this case, SNTV -- within the framework of a general approach to the study of "embedded institutions." The essays as a whole provide a look at SNTV's adoption and rejection and its uses and consequences across different settings, both similar and different. The concluding essays seek to integrate previous research on comparative electoral systems: to consider what the basic effects of SNTV are, and how its embedding in different types of political systems constrains or changes the nature of those effects. Thus, we see this book as

an exercise in comparative institutional analysis, with potentially important theoretical results and methodological lessons that extend well beyond the field of electoral system research.

The term "embedding" has been used in a variety of ways in the literature on comparative politics. Here, we use the term "embedded institution" to refer to the fact that any single feature of a political system, such as choice of electoral system, cannot be fully understood without understanding its interactions with other features of political life.¹² Thus, on the one hand, seemingly identical institutions may not always yield similar behavior once we recognize contextual factors and constraints. On the other hand, the choice of institutions is not independent of context, thus longitudinal historical analysis is important if we are not to mistake the nature of causality.¹³ Moreover, as one of the editors has previously noted, there can be a kind of "institutional synergism" in which no single institution produces the observed behavior (Woodall, 1996).

In looking at SNTV as an embedded institution, it is useful to view SNTV as a middle-level object whose basic theoretically derived implications/consequences will be both affected by macro-level features of political life (e.g., party systems,¹⁴ and regime structure)¹⁵ and influenced by the micro-level choices of actors, on the other.¹⁶ A la the "new institutionalism" in rational choice, we might think of actors'¹⁷ choices as being embedded in institutional settings that can be thought of as imposing constraints on their feasible choices, on the one hand,¹⁸ and at the choice of institutions being motivated by concern for their consequences, on the other (see, e.g., Shepsle, 1981). We might also wish to draw on ideas such as those of Tsebelis (1990), who considers how to model the situation where the choices actors make have consequences for them in more than

one arena -- what he calls "nested games." Thus, when we consider the incentives of parties and candidates under SNTV we might take SNTV as a given; but we would also wish to look at how actors decide among electoral systems. Ideally, when we do so, we wish to consider how those choices can be expected to affect them, not just in terms of immediate electoral consequences, but also in terms of other arenas of political conflict, e.g., struggles for democratization. We also wish to disaggregate consequences to go beyond considering parties as unitary actors.¹⁹

The Preface to this volume discusses some of the methodological considerations involved in the approach to the study of embedded institutions that motivated our selection of topics in this volume and our expectations about the ways in which the contributions of the volume as a whole could be more than the sum of the contributions of its individual chapters. We believe that the implications of SNTV can usefully be modeled even before we consider the complications caused by its social and political embedding. However, because SNTV is not the only election system that has been used in Japan and Korea, and because the effects of SNTV in Taiwan have varied with the nature of the regime context, and because SNTV has also been used in local nonpartisan elections in the U.S., the essays in this volume allow us to look at the interaction between the use of SNTV and other aspects of electoral and political life in a genuinely comparative perspective, both across nations and across time.²⁰

Another component of the study of embedded institutions we make use of is comparisons between the institution whose effects we wish to understand, here SNTV, and other similar institutions. This has the dual purpose of preventing us ascribing to SNTV effects that are not unique to it, and helps us to better understand exactly which features of SNTV (e.g.,

multimember districts, single votes, choice of candidate rather than choice of party) produce which effects.

Before we review the contributions of our chapter authors, we wish to discuss our perceptions of how we might best think of SNTV as being an embedded institution within our three settings of Japan, Korea and Taiwan,²¹ as well as provide the reader the basic summary facts about the use of SNTV in these countries .

SNTV in Japan

The story of SNTV in Japanese electoral politics is long and filled with intrigue. From 1951 to 1983, SNTV was component of the staggered elections in the upper chamber of the national parliament, the House of Councilors. Under that system, 100 of the 252 members of the upper house were elected at-large under SNTV, with staggered six-year terms bringing 50 seats up for election every three years, and the remaining seats a mix of single-member districts and multimember district elections filled using list PR. In 1983 the SNTV component of this system was replaced by national list PR.²² As we shall see, elections for the House of Representatives, Japan's lower house, have been held with various types of electoral rules and constituency sizes over the past century. In the July 1993 election, the last election held under SNTV, the 129 House Districts elected 511 members to the Diet. Eight were two-seat constituencies; 39 were three-seat constituencies; 34 districts had four seats each; 46 districts elected five members; and the Hokkaido first and Fukuoka first districts elected six members.²³ In 1994, the repeated attempts to "reform" the election system for the lower chamber to reduce malapportionment and to do away with SNTV were finally successful as an after effect of the "shock

wave" of 1993 that transformed Japanese politics. SNTV was replaced with a system, similar to that adopted for Japan's upper chamber in 1983, that makes use of both single-member districts and list PR.²⁴ Japan's new system calls for three-fifths of Lower House seats to be elected by plurality vote in single-member districts, with the remainder to be awarded by proportional representation in eleven regional blocs. As of the time of this writing (September 1995) no election had yet taken under the new system.

In many ways, Japan's changing electoral order mirrors the country's evolution from a fully authoritarian system to a parliamentary democracy. During the first two decades following the beginning of Japan's industrialization in 1868, an oligarchy composed primarily of erstwhile samurai from southwestern provinces consolidated control over an authoritarian regime. Under pressure from nascent political parties, and desperately seeking to demonstrate Japan's "democratic" civility to the outside world, the oligarchs promulgated a constitution that went into effect in 1890. Over the course of the next decade, the oligarchs consolidated their dominance under an electoral system patterned after the British model of one- and two-member districts. Authoritarian control was assisted by a highly restrictive franchise in which only one-percent of the populace -- tax-paying males above the age of 25 -- was granted the right to vote.

But the political parties were not as malleable as the oligarchs had hoped, and, in 1900, a leading oligarch condescended to become head of a political party. This move led to the interpenetration of the bureaucratic and legislative elite, and increased accommodation between the oligarch-dominated government and the political parties. At the same time,

another leading oligarch engineered the installation of SNTV in "large" districts (one- to thirteen-members). The intention was to divide the parties and prevent them, as the mouthpiece of the interests of the land-owning class (whose land taxes financed the bulk of governmental activity), from interfering with the fiscal policies deemed necessary to achieve statist developmental aims. In fact, SNTV served to weaken party leadership and increase the cost of campaigning, thus generating widespread clientalism and corruption. A system of "small" districts (one- to three-members) was created in 1919 in the midst of an expanding democratic rights movement and the election of the first "commoner" prime minister.²⁵

In 1925, with the debut of universal manhood suffrage marking the zenith in a period of transitional democracy (1900-1932), the three largest parties enacted a system of SNTV in "medium" districts (three- to five-members). From 1932 until the 1945 surrender, Japan was ruled by an authoritarian regime headed by military-dominated cabinets operating behind a thin democratic facade.²⁶ As part of a campaign to "demilitarize" and "democratize" Japan, electoral institutions were radically reformed during the American occupation (1945-1952), when a "large" district system (two- to fourteen-members) was imposed. With the first signs of the Cold War on the horizon and in the wake of the tumultuous 1946 election, in which socialists and even a few communists won seats, conservative party leaders persuaded the American occupiers of the benefits to be gained by a return to the cozy old system SNTV in medium-magnitude constituencies. This electoral engineering paved the way for protracted and stable dominance by conservative cabinets, culminating in 38 years of uninterrupted single-party rule under the LDP (1955-1993).

SNTV generated different policy consequences at different points in Japan's history. During the 1868-1899 period, electoral institutions were part of a democratic facade erected by the oligarchs to placate domestic demands and show a civilized face to the Western world in order to gain repeal of the "unequal treaties."²⁷ Behind this facade, the oligarchy orchestrated a forced-draft program of industrialization under the slogan "rich country, strong military" (*fukoku kyohei*). The establishment of SNTV at the turn of the century testifies to the increased influence of political parties and the oligarchs' conviction that something needed to be done to ensure that state-led economic development not be undermined by narrow partisan appeals. During the militarist period (1932-1945), elections held under an SNTV system lent legitimacy to revived authoritarianism at home and military adventurism abroad. The reinstatement of SNTV in medium constituencies in 1947 ushered in nearly half a decade of stable conservative dominance that contributed to the achievement of high-speed, export-led growth. During the era of LDP supremacy, SNTV offered strong incentives for intraparty factionalism, which, in turn, enabled a continuous circulation of the legislative elite without a change in party rule. A side effect of the skewed allocation of public resources to farmers, small retailers, and other groups in the LDP's largely rural-based supportive coalition was an equitable distribution of national economic wealth that legitimized Japan's steep and painful developmental trajectory to the front ranks of industrialized countries. Finally, by contributing to the LDP's protracted legislative dominance, SNTV fortified the ties linking Japan's legislative, bureaucratic, and industrial elite. This seamless web of mutual interactions connected a system of systematized corruption with a government-business

76

partnership founded upon extensive bargaining and cross-fertilization (Woodall, 1996).

SNTV in Korea

Since Korea was liberated and achieved independence in 1948, National Assembly elections have used four different electoral systems. The first system, employed from the 1st (1948) to 5th (1960) elections, is SMD plurality. The second one, used for elections to the 6th National Assembly (1963), the 7th (1967), and the 8th (1971), is a mix of SMD and proportionality. This system was reinstated in 1988 and has been used for the last two elections (the 13th in 1988 and the 14th 1992). In the third one, employed in the 9th and 10th elections (1973 and 1978, respectively), two-thirds of the seats were elected from two-member district SNTV and the remaining one-third were filled upon recommendation of the President. Finally, the fourth system, used in the 11th and 12th elections (1981 and 1985, respectively), was a combination of a two-member district SNTV with proportionality. Thus, SNTV was employed for some of the seats in the unicameral South Korean National Assembly from 1973 until 1988.

In addition to four types of electoral systems in fourteen elections during the past forty-four years, Korean Assembly elections have been subject to various rules concerning the total number of districts and the mechanism of proportionality for the at-large seats. For instance, the current (1995) National Assembly consists of 299 seats: 237 seats are elected from single-member districts and 62 at-large seats. The at-large seats are filled by means of party lists under a proportion system. If parties either win five district seats or more or receive more than three

percent of total votes, each of these parties is ensured one of the 62 at-large seats. The remaining seats are allocated to the parties that win five district seats or more, in proportion to each party's share of district seats. The current system is very different from the 1985 election in which two-thirds of the 276 seats were elected from 92 two-member districts. Roughly two-thirds of the remaining 92 at-large seats were allotted to the party that captured the greatest number of district seats, while the rest were divided proportionally among the other parties according to the number of district seats each obtained.

These frequent changes in electoral rules and systems reflect the turbulent history of South Korean politics. The first electoral system, SMD plurality, was employed by Syngman Rhee's regime, which ruled Korea for twelve years and was overthrown by the popular student revolution in 1960. As Park Chung-Hee, the leader of 1961 military coup, took control of the government in 1963, he adopted a new system: a combination of SMD with proportionality. However, when Park intended to secure his absolute control over the political system and to guarantee his indefinite continuation of the presidency, SNTV was introduced as part of the infamous Yushin (National Revitalization) Constitution in 1972. Under Chun's authoritarian regime established after Park's assassination, a two-member district SNTV in conjunction with proportionality became the fourth electoral system. Finally, the most recent change occurred in 1988 when the Roh regime came to power. SNTV was replaced with a mix of SMD and proportionality, which was used under Park's regime in the 1960s.

Such frequent changes produce bifurcating effects on electoral reform efforts. On the one hand, there is a need for a new electoral system

76

which does not reflect a particular regime's own interests. Various problems associated with the current system would also justify electoral reforms. On the other hand, the public tends to view reform efforts as suspicious and to some extent unacceptable, since numerous changes in the past were mostly motivated for political goals. Moreover, some electoral systems employed by authoritarian regimes make them unattractive. For instance, SNTV is often mentioned as an alternative to eliminate regionalism, which has been a serious problem in elections. However, the authoritarian use of SNTV by Park and Chun reminds voters of its negative effects only.

SNTV in Taiwan

In Taiwan, since at least the time of the Kuomintang retreat from the mainland, SNTV has been used for virtually all community and county councils and for the Taiwan provincial assembly.²⁸ Very recently, SNTV has been used in conjunction with list PR for elections to the National Assembly and the legislative Yuan, but with most seats still filled under SNTV and the PR seats used primarily for representation from outside Taiwan. In the 1991 National Assembly election, 100 out of 325 seats were elected by PR with the rest by SNTV. In the legislative Yuan election of 1992, 36 out of 161 seats were elected by PR, and the rest mainly by SNTV.²⁹

The early (post-War period (1945-1960) saw the establishment of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, under an overwhelmingly predominant party, the Kuomintang (KMT). Under "consolidating authoritarianism," elections were confined to local offices. The function of these elections was

to bolster the Nationalist state by placating both American and Taiwanese demands for some local democracy. Nationalist policy was decided largely by the Nationalist leadership, and more influenced by American advice than by domestic politics. SNTV was used to elect community, county, and provincial assemblymen (the last from within multi-member county-level constituencies). Most candidates were Nationalist nominees and genuinely opposition candidates were mostly suppressed. The Nationalists coopted local elites through economic favors such as government contracts and local monopolies, and exemptions from land use and environmental regulations,

The middle post-War period (1960-1975) was the heyday of Nationalist authoritarianism on Taiwan. Under "consolidated authoritarianism," SNTV helped maintain political stability, continuing to coopt local elites, to defuse mass opposition, and to maintain Nationalist policy autonomy. Most elections continued to more local offices, gradually consolidating clientalistic local factions that were based partly on pre-existing territorial cleavages and partly on competition for Nationalist nomination and local support. SNTV was extended to the election from Taiwan of a few additional representatives to national bodies that the Nationalists had brought with them from the mainland (the National Assembly and national Legislature). The representatives elected to those bodies from the mainland in the late 1940s remained in office until the early 1990s.

In the late post-War period (1975-1990), Taiwan achieved a transition from authoritarianism. Under "transitional authoritarianism," the number of seats elected from Taiwan to national bodies was gradually increased to roughly the same number as elected from Taiwan to the

provincial assembly, and many Nationalist politicians were promoted from the local to the national areas. The size of constituencies for national seats gradually declined, into rough alignment with existing constituencies for local office, whose factional-electoral dynamics the KMT had long since thoroughly mastered. Consequently the KMT remained firmly in control of all national bodies, gradually replacing aging representatives from the mainland with younger cadres from Taiwan. Nevertheless, SNTV gave the incipient oppositions some representation, typically one seat from some of the larger and more cosmopolitan constituencies. Rising prosperity increased the economic scope and stakes of public office. However, rising competition also shifted politicians from obtaining economic favors for themselves and their clients toward competing to deliver economic benefits to their constituencies.

In the early post-Cold War period Taiwan is well on its way toward achieving transition to democracy. Under "transitional democracy," the KMT finally retired all mainland representatives from national bodies. The KMT abolished national seats elected by functional groups, but retained some "overseas" representatives from the Chinese diaspora. The National Assembly and National Legislature were reelected completely from Taiwan, still using local-based SNTV, though now with some additional seats allocated from national party slates in proportion to the popular vote. With still greater prosperity and competition, the political-economic effects of SNTV have become more pronounced -- inflating money politics and providing businessmen more direct and comprehensive access to economic legislating. Meanwhile the severe cumulative effects of lax local economic and environmental regulation, resulting in part from SNTV, have

76

themselves become political issues. Democracy has begun to shift the fulcrum of SNTV from local elites to local masses.

Organization of the volume

The organization of this volume is into five sections: Choices, Campaigns, Consequences, Classification and Comparison, and Context. Of necessity, there is some overlap in the materials covered in the various chapters. While we, as editors, have sought to minimize duplication, we have permitted some repetition, e.g., in describing basic facts about electoral system use in each country, in recognition of the fact that it is likely that separate chapters of this volume will often be read alone and should be self-standing.

Section I (Choices) looks at issues of electoral engineering such as why was SNTV chosen and why was its use discontinued. We believe that it is useful both to understand the options considered in selecting among electoral systems and the perceptions of the actors as to what their choices are expected to achieve. The chapter by Brian Woodall that opens this section deals primarily with the 1994 decision to replace SNTV in Japan's lower chamber -- a decision that came after what Woodall refers to as "decades of hollow oratory and many futile attempts." It pays particular attention to the internal politics of the LDP. The chapter by Sung-Chull Lee examines in detail the reasons for the choice of SNTV in Korea in 1972,³⁰ and focuses on certain features of that system, such as campaigning rules that led to voter apathy and minimized opportunities for meaningful opposition to the DRP. The third essay in this section, by John Hsieh, looks at the different incentives of the various parties on

Taiwan to propose changes in district magnitude (the number of candidates elected in each district) or threshold requirements, or to propose the incorporation of elements of proportional representation into the electoral system.

Section II (Campaigns) looks at campaigning and voter choice under SNTV. The opening essay, by Jean-Marie Bouissou, is based primarily on an extensive field study conducted in Hyogo prefecture and the City of Fukuoka, Japan. Its central focus is on the organization of candidate constituency support groups, known in Japan as *koenkai*, but it also looks at other aspects of electoral competition in Japan, such as stability of outcomes at the constituency level. The next essay, by Haruhiro Fukui and Shigeko Fukai, focuses on the career of one long-term LDP diet member and on the nature of his campaign organization and interactions with his constituents. It also considers general issues of candidate selection, intra-factional competition and money politics under SNTV. The third chapter in this section, by Ichiro Miyake, is the only one in the volume to draw on survey research data. Miyake is generally concerned with the relative importance of parties versus candidates in SNTV voting for the Japanese Diet. The next chapter, by I-Chou Liu, shifts the locus of investigation from Japan to Taiwan. He describes in detail the Kuomintang's organizational structure at the local level and how the party solves the problem of optimally allocating voting among its candidates in multimember SNTV districts.

Section III (Consequences) contains essays that look at the degree to which SNTV systems proportionally transform votes into seats and essays that model the effects of SNTV on parties and factions. The opening essay in this section, by Steven Reed and John Bolland, extends earlier work by

Reed modifying Duverger's law (that single-member districts tend to produce two-party competition) to make it applicable to candidate competition in SNTV elections at the constituency level. Reed and Bolland develop a further generalization that allows a prediction (as a function of district magnitudes) of the overall number of factions within the major national party that can be expected to develop under SNTV. The next essay, by Jongrin Mo and David Brady, looks at some of the electoral consequences of SNTV's use in Korea; the authors also examine the reasons why use of SNTV was ended in Korea in 1988. Kap-Yun Lee's contribution, based on the two SNTV elections in Korea, examines the effects of the SNTV system on the nature of party competition and voting behavior. Edwin Winckler's essay looks at electoral equilibria in Japan in terms of questions such as the ratio of candidates to victories and the number of factions, paralleling and extending earlier work by Reed on Japan. It also develops a model of how SNTV's effects varied over time as a function of changing regime type, from authoritarian rule in Taiwan to nascent democratization.

Section IV (Classification and Comparison) looks at the place of SNTV in the family of electoral systems. The first essay, by Bernard Grofman, provides a theoretical comparison of the properties of SNTV and other systems with which it has much in common, such as STV (the single transferable vote, a.k.a. the Hare System), D'Hondt list PR, and plurality elections in single-member districts (SMDs). It argues that the usual focus of the electoral systems literature on classifying systems in terms of their degree of proportionality in the translation of seats and votes misses critical differences among electoral systems (e.g., in incentives for localism) that group them in ways quite different from the usual PR versus plurality

dichotomy/continuum. The chapter by Kathleen Bawn, Gary Cox and Frances Rosenbluth compares the electoral volatility of party shares under SNTV in Japan with volatility in two single-member-district systems (the U.S. and Great Britain) and in one mixed system (Germany). The third essay in this section, by Arend Lijphart, compares electoral effects of SNTV in Japan with those of STV in Ireland and Malta, with a principal focus on measures of proportionality of seat-votes relationships.

Section V (Context) contains essays viewing SNTV cross-nationally. The essay by Gary Cox and Emerson Niou compares proportionality of SNTV seats-votes relationships in Japan and Taiwan. The chapter by Edwin Winckler compares SNTV's effects on political economy in Japan and Taiwan, such as the degree of localistic and/or private-goods orientation among legislators. Winckler shows how SNTV's effects can change over time as the regime or party system changes.

The concluding essay, by Grofman, identifies ten summary propositions about SNTV, synthesized primarily from the previous literature on Japanese politics, and reviews evidence, a good deal of it from this volume, about the extent to which these propositions hold in Japan, Korea and Taiwan.

1. SNTV generates very strong intra-party competition within a given multimember district. Indeed, in many circumstances, a candidate's chief rival(s) will be a member (or members) of his own party.

2. Under SNTV, the combination of intra-party and inter-party competition places an especially great premium on reliable voters and thus enhances the influence of groups that can "deliver" blocs of voters.

76

3. SNTV gives rise to quasi-permanent electoral bases and bases of campaign organization tied to a "segmented" electorate that allow seats to be "passed down," almost like feudal inheritances.

4. SNTV, as a multimember district semi-proportional system, permits manipulation of electoral success in terms both of population discrepancies across districts that would favor supporters of particular parties and in the number of seats assigned to a given district.

5. Over the long run, controlling for malapportionment, SNTV leads to an allocation of seats to votes that is far closer to the PR than to the plurality end of the proportionality continuum. However, this proportionality may be reduced by special mechanisms, such as seat bonuses, intended to superimpose majoritarian features on semi-proportional (or proportional) systems.

6. SNTV, as a multimember district semi-proportional system, provides incentives for more than two parties to compete, with the number of parties closely linked to the average number of seats per constituency.

7. SNTV provides strong incentives for party factionalism because of the incentives for intra-party competition at the district level and the localistic and particularistic orientation of candidates. These incentives are in part a function of m , the number of seats in a district.

76

8. Parties learn to develop equilibrium strategies based on their expected levels of vote support. The long-run dynamics of SNTV competition tends to result in low levels of interparty competition since parties tend to run candidates only where there is a reasonable chance to win a seat. SNTV 's quasi-permanent electoral bases tend to yield relatively low inter-election volatility and insulation of seats from national electoral tides.

9. Because candidates are competing with members of their own party as well as members of opposing parties, SNTV fosters a strong localistic and personalistic orientation in which members compete to provide "personal" and "group-based" services to their individual constituencies and downplay wider policy issues.

10. SNTV increases the importance of money in politics because of the need to wage both an intra-party and an inter-party campaign and the importance of party factions, and because of the relative absence of issue-based politics and the desires of the various long-standing electoral constituencies to receive rewards for their loyalty. These features of SNTV enhance the potential for corruption.

The ten propositions above deal with a variety of concerns, including the nature of campaigning and campaign organizations under SNTV (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3), seats-votes proportionality and the use of SNTV as a tool of electoral engineering and party advantage (Hypotheses 4 and 5), incentives under SNTV for party and factional proliferation and inter-party and intra-party competition (Hypotheses 6, 7 and 8), and the policy

consequences of SNTV (Hypotheses 9 and 10). As Grofman notes, "(m)ost are rooted in theoretical expectations derived from the idea that electoral institutions structure the incentives of players in the electoral arena, whether voters, candidates or parties."³¹ He finds support for all ten propositions in the Japanese experience with SNTV, and support for most of them when looking at Taiwan and Korea. In considering the instances in which these propositions require substantial modification, Grofman's essay draws on the research reported in this volume to consider SNTV as an embedded institution so as to suggest ways in which past history and features of political life such as party systems interact with SNTV.

As Grofman himself notes, his chapter should in no way be regarded as the last word with respect to SNTV as an embedded institution. Rather it should be seen as "a compressed summary of what is known, and an open invitation to further work that would: (a) view electoral systems choice as a component of a multi-level game, (b) develop a more fully articulated model of electoral system impact that would subsume/extend/reformulate its ten central propositions, (c) refine and develop ideas of embeddedness by better identifying the levels within which embedding can occur, (d) provide specific hypotheses about interaction."

We would emphasize the collaborative and ongoing nature of research. Just as this volume builds on previous electoral systems and country-specific scholarship, we are confident that its chapters will provide a foundation for further work on electoral rules as embedded institutions.³² But we would also hope that the methodologies of natural experiment and most-similar/most different systems design the chapters draw upon; as well as the varieties of qualitative, quantitative and formal

approaches found in the volume, will provide methodological guidelines and inspiration for researchers in comparative politics outside the electoral systems arena as well. In particular, we hope we have outlined a useful model for comparative research, involving a multi-layered research design which makes use of comparisons over time, over nations, and over types of institution; which begins with a particular type of institution as its principal focus and widens out from there; and which is concerned with the development and testing of empirically grounded theory.

¹See, e.g., the various essays in Lijphart and Grofman (1984) and Grofman and Lijphart (1986), or Lijphart et al. (1994), or any issue of Electoral Studies.

²See also Coleman (1971, 1972); Aranson and Ordeshook (1972); and Owen and Grofman (1995) on the effects of primaries on the ideological structure of two-party competition.

³For example, Geddes (1995: 269), in her discussion of the prospects for democracy in Eastern Europe, observes that perceptions of government as "disorderly, inefficient, irritating, opportunistic, squabbling and petty are likely to be exaggerated in countries in which electoral institutions, such as the open list in Poland and single-member districts in Hungary, undermine party discipline." (However, Geddes also notes that "(l)ow opinions of government, especially the legislature, are common even in long-lived stable democracies.")

⁴It is also worth noting that choice of electoral systems appears closely linked to other aspects of constitutional design (see esp. Lijphart's 1980 discussion of the features of the Westminster model versus the consensus model).

⁵ Political culture has sometimes been used a "catch-all" explanation for many features of political life in certain countries. For example, Park (1988a: 1063) emphasizes how "personalism, a persistent characteristic of Korean culture, shapes legislator-constituency linkages." Similarly, Bogdanor (1985b, emphasis in original), summarizing the findings presented from the Farrell (Ireland) and Rydon (Australia) chapters of Bogdanor (1985a), asserts that the evidence derived from their work, "while by no means conclusive, tends to reinforce the central argument of this book that electoral systems are *not* fundamental in determining parliamentarian/constituency relationships. Instead it would seem that, both in Ireland and in Tasmania, it is cultural factors which are dominant and the single transferable vote has reinforced cultural pressures rather

than altering or profoundly modifying them" (see also Bogdanor, 1983). We recognize that political culture can constrain the repertoire of feasible institutional options, and that it affects the nature of actor motivations by conditioning the nature of perceived rewards and punishments in the society, but we prefer to see how much explanatory power can be derived from an analysis of embedded institutions (see below) in explaining variations in outcomes both within and between countries before drawing on what is usually an essentially static concept such as political culture. However, it is important to recognize that political culture can be conceptualized in a way that makes it useful as an explanatory tool, even in accounting for change (see Eckstein, 1988, 1992). Moreover, we do not find a stark dichotomy between a rational choice and a culturalist approach to be a useful way to think about explanation in the social sciences (Grofman, 1997 forthcoming; cf. Grofman, 1996c forthcoming).

⁶Brian Woodall (personal communication, July 1995) points out that, in Japan, SNTV in medium-sized multimember districts does not merely affect the behavioral patterns of politicians and voters, it also creates incentives for particular kinds of behavior on the part of government officials and special interests (e.g., construction contractors). A look at the inventory of propositions about the effects of SNTV in the concluding chapter reinforces this point.

⁷In the Japanese electoral context, Michael Theis (e-mail communication, SSJ-Forum: RE "Electoral System Reforms and Political Behaviour," June 15, 1995) observes that implications of 1994 electoral law change will not be immediate: "extant parties and individual incumbents and *koenkai*-based campaigning" introduce stickiness. He also makes the more general point that "new institutionalist" models should never assume that politics is a "frictionless market."

⁸Cf. Rose (1984).

⁹We say, "seemingly as dissimilar," because, for most of this century, Alabama was characterized by one-party dominance and the playing out of

within-party factional conflicts in primaries (Key, 1949) in ways that can be seen as having direct parallels to post-WW II SNTV politics in Japan, Korea and Taiwan.

¹⁰Because the literature on SNTV in Japan is more developed, we found ourselves with more essays on Japan than on either Korea or Taiwan.

¹¹Also, in looking at electoral system impact in Taiwan we shed further light on the first instance of a Chinese society successfully democratizing -- a process of particular importance because Chinese peoples make up between a fifth and a fourth of the world's population. Furthermore, Taiwan is a case of transition from authoritarianism and thus has potential implications for many countries around the world. Winckler (this volume) argues that use of SNTV played a strategic and positive role in Taiwan's transition toward democracy.

¹²An important and insightful general discussion of comparative research which, i.a., makes these points is Przeworski and Teune (1970).

¹³This point is strongly emphasized by a number of authors, e.g., Nohlen, 1981; Taagepera and Grofman, 1985. As Mainwaring (1991:40) insists: "it is inadequate to think only of the problem in terms of the 'political consequences of electoral laws.' This problem is essential, but it is only half the equation. The other half is understanding why electoral laws were chosen." One of the editors of this volume is planning on co-editing with Arend Lijphart a volume on electoral origins and electoral engineering in Scandinavia that will focus on a detailed historical investigations of the motivations that lead to choice of electoral systems and to changes therein. In this volume, several of the chapters pay particular attention to the considerations that went in to the decision to adopt or replace a particular electoral system.

¹⁴By "party system" we simply mean the number of parties and their relative sizes along with the nature of the cleavages that structure party competition. One of us (Winckler, personal communication, June 1992) has

suggested the more encompassing term "political order" for what kinds of incumbent-opposition relations prevail and what kinds of conflict groups are involved. ("Is the system dominated by one party? Are electoral conflict groups based on preexisting corporatism or clientalism? Do parties or candidacies arise almost entirely in response to electoral opportunities?")

¹⁵By "regime structure" we mean such conventional distinctions as that among "authoritarian," "traditional" and "democratic regimes"; or more detailed breakdowns such as "hard authoritarian" versus "soft authoritarian," or "liberal democracy" versus "consociational democracy."

¹⁶In turn, these higher level features of political systems might be embedded in a still broader arena. For example, Wallerstein (1975) proposed a sweeping political-economic model of the capitalist world with three functional zones (core, semi-periphery, and periphery), and argued that a country's political economy would differ systematically according to the zone in which it was embedded.

¹⁷Here, of course, "actor" need not mean a single person but some entity (e.g., a political party or a faction or even a nation state) that, for analytic purposes, we treat as a unitary actor.

¹⁸For example, Bogdanor (1985b: 295) has argued that a "strong party system will militate against constituency being the focus of the parliamentarian's activity." Of course, there can be an interactive effect in that certain types of electoral systems may facilitate strong parties (see Grofman, this volume, chap. 14).

¹⁹Cf. Grofman, Mershon and Tsebelis (1997 forthcoming).

²⁰Here, time can be taken as a shorthand for various types of political system changes, some of which may be exogenous to the electoral rules of the game, and some of which include changes in the electoral rules themselves.

21 Here, Winckler's discussion of regime type and regime change (Winckler, this volume, Chapter 15) helped provide a structure for these three overviews.

22 Since 1983, the 152 seats not elected via the national list are elected from prefecture-wide constituencies. Of the 47 prefectures, two elect eight members, four have six seats, 15 are four-seat constituencies, and 26 elect two members. Elections, however, are staggered, with only half the seats up at each election.

23 The Amami Islands, the lone single-member constituency that became the fabled "gilded seat" (kinken giseki) because of its outrageously costly and competitive campaigns, was absorbed into the four-member Kagoshima first district prior to the 1993 election.

24 Here, as in New Zealand in 1995 and in Korea in 1988, we see the influence of the German mixed system as a model for electoral reform.

25 By being the first individual to simultaneously hold a Lower House seat and head a majority party cabinet, Kei (or Takashi) Hara earned the epithet of Japan's first "commoner" prime minister.

26 Although national elections continued to be held until 1942, the vast majority of successful candidates were endorsed by a corporatist umbrella organization (Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association) that had absorbed the political parties.

27 Beginning with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1858, the Western imperialist powers imposed a series of treaties that, inter alia, dictated extraterritorial rights and consular courts for foreigners and fixed tariff rates on imported goods into Japan. Revision of these "unequal treaties" became one of the foremost goals of the Japanese government.

28 The parliament of Taiwan has been given only minimal authority because of the claim by the Kuomintang "national" government that theirs is the government of all China and that Taiwan is only a province. As

described below, until the early 1990's, "national" bodies in Taiwan continued to reflect previous incumbencies from elections on the mainland with growing but still token additions from Taiwan.

²⁹These seats were filled based on aggregate party vote shares in the SNTV seats. Moreover, the KMT insisted on a high threshold (5% of the popular vote) before any party could gain a PR seat, effectively denying such seats to the smaller parties (for further details see Hsieh, this volume).

³⁰That topic is also considered more briefly in the Mo and Brady chapter (this volume).

³¹Grofman does not attempt to provide an integrated formal model of electoral incentives from which all the propositions below can be deduced.

³² Some of which, will, we hope, like this volume, involve multi-author collaborative scholarship.