Psych 215L: Language Acquisition

Lecture 10
Word-Meaning Mapping 2



Smith & Yu (2008)


Learning in cases of referential ambiguity:

Why? "...not all opportunities for word learning are as uncluttered as the experimental settings in which fast-mapping has been demonstrated. In everyday contexts, there are typically many words, many potential referents, limited cues as to which words go with which referents, and rapid attentional shifts among the many entities in the scene."

Also, "...the evidence indicates that 9-, 10-, and certainly 12-month-old infants are accumulating considerable receptive lexical knowledge ...Yet many studies find that children even as old as 18 months have difficulty in making the right inferences about the intended referents of novel words...infants as young as 13 or 14 months...can link a name to an object given repeated unambiguous pairings in a single session. Overall, however, these effects are fragile with small experimental variations often leading to no learning."

Smith & Yu (2008) New approach: infants accrue statistical evidence across multiple trials that are individually ambiguous but can be disambiguated when the

ew approach. Infants accurate statistical evidence across manipe trais that are individually ambiguous but can be disambiguated when the information from the trials is aggregated.



'dog' 'ball'

Fig. 1. Associations among words and referents across two individually ambiguous scenes. If a young learner calculates co-occurrences frequencies across these two trials, s/he can find the proper mapping of "Ball" to BALL.

Smith & Yu (2008)

Requirements:

(1)Learner notices absence of b in Trial 4 (2)Learner remembers

absence of g in Trial 1

(3)Learner registers occurrences & non-

A more complicated example: Trial 1: A = a (.5), b (.5)? B = a (.5), b (.5)?
Trial 2: C = c (.5), d (.5)? D = c (.5), d (.5)?
Trial 3: E = e (.5), f (.5)? F = e (.5), f (.5)? Trial 4:

A = g (.3), a (.3), b (.3)? G = g (.5), a (.5)?(but wait! b isn't present, so A = b has prob 0)

A = aG = g

Trial	Words	Potential referents in scene		
ĭ	AB	ba		
2	CD	de de		
3	EF	ef		
4	GA	ga		


Smith & Yu (2008)


Yu & Smith (2007): Adults seem able to accomplish this.

Smith & Yu ask: Can 12- and 14-month-old infants do this? (Relevant age for beginning word-learning.)

Requirements: (1)Learner notices absence of b in Trial 4 (2)Learner remembers absence of g in Trial 1 (3)Learner registers occurrences & non-(4)Learner calculates correct statistics based off this information


Trial	Words	Potential referents in scene		
1	AB	ba		
2	AB CD EF	de		
3	EF	cf		
4	GA	ga		





Smith & Yu (2008): Experiment

Results: Infants preferentially look at target over distracter, and 14-montholds looked longer than 12-month-olds.



Smith & Yu (2008)

Interesting point: More ambiguity within trials may lead to better learning overall

"Yu and Smith (2007; Yu et al., 2007), using a task much like the infant task used here, showed that adults actually learned more word-referent pairs when the set contained 18 words and referents than when it contained only 9. This is because more words and referents mean better evidence against spurious correlations. Although much remains to be discovered about the relevant mechanisms, they clearly should help children learn from the regularities that accrue across the many ambiguous word-scene pairings that occur in everyday communication."

Smith & Yu (2008)

This kind of statistical learning vs. transitional probability learning

"The statistical regularities to which infants must attend to learn wordreferent pairings are different from those underlying the segmentation of a
sequential stream in that word-referent pairings require computing cooccurrence frequencies across two streams of events (words and
referents) simultaneously for many words and referents. Nonetheless, the
present findings, like the earlier ones showing statistical learning of
sequential probabilities, suggest that solutions to fundamental problems
in learning language may be found by studying the statistical patterns in
the learning environment and the statistical learning mechanisms in the
learner (Newport & Aslin, 2004; Saffran et al., 1996)"

Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum (2009)

Redefining the problem: (It's harder)

Not just about learning stable lexicon of word-meaning mappings, but also about the intention of the speaker at the moment.

"Social theories suggest that learners rely on a rich understanding of the goals and intentions of speakers...once the child understands what is being talked about, the mappings between words and referents are relatively easy to learn (St. Augustine, 397/1963; Baldwin, 1993; Bloom, 2002; Tomasello, 2003). These theories must assume some mechanism for making mappings, but this mechanism is often taken to be deterministic, and its details are rarely specified. In contrast, cross-situational accounts of word learning take advantage of the fact that words often refer to the immediate environment of the speaker, which allows learners to build a lexicon based on consistent associations between words and their referents (Locke, 1690/1964; Siskind, 1996; Smith, 2000; Yu & Smith, 2007)."

[How different are these accounts, really?]

Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum (2009)


ems for learning based on cross-situational idea that referents are

..speakers often talk about objects that are not visible and about actions that are not in progress at the moment of speech (Gleitman, 1990), adding noise to the correlations between words and objects."

Solution: appeal to external social/communication cues "...cross-situational and associative theories often appeal to external social cues, such as eye gaze (Smith, 2000; Yu & Ballard, 2007), but these are used as markers of salience (the "warm glow" of attention), rather than as evidence about internal states of the speaker, as in social theories."

Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum (2009)

Task: Identify lexicon items for object nouns



Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum (2009)



What people intend to say (I) is a function of the world around them (specifically, the objects O present).

Assumption:

The words people say (W) are a function of what people intend to say (I = objects intended) and how those intentions can be translated with the language they speak (using lexicon items L)

Model





$P(L|C) \propto P(C|L)P(L)$


Model learns a probability distribution over unobserved lexicons L (one I = set of lexicon items), given an observed corpus C of situations.


Prior P(L) favors parsimony (fewer lexical items): exponentially penalized for each additional lexical item


 $P(L) \propto e^{-\alpha|L|}$
































Testing the Model: Corpus Evaluation Input Corpus: Rollins videos of parents interacting with preverbal infants Annotated with all mid-size objects judged to be visible to the infant. Other word-learning models evaluated on same data, and all models judged on the accuracy of the lexicons learned and inferences on speaker intentions Speaker Intentions: Intentional model = intention with Madel Procession Recall, and F Score for the Referential Instations Madel Procession Recall and F Procession Recall F Procession Recall Pro

intentional model = intention with highest posterior probability given lexicon

Other models = objects for which matching words in best lexicon had been uttered

Model	Precision	Recall	Freore
Association frequency	27	.81	.40
Conditional probability (object/word)	.59	.36	.45
Conditional probability (wordinbject)	.32	.79	.46
Mutual information	.36	.37	.37
Translation model (object/word)	.57	.41	.48
Translation model (wordlobject)	:40	.57	.47
Intentional model	.83	.45	.58
Intentional model (one parameter)	.77	.36	.50

Note: Intentional model with "one parameter" is when α is the only free parameter.

Testing the Model: Corpus Evaluation

Why did the intentional model work so well?

"The high precision of the lexicon found by our model was likely due to two factors. First, the distinction between referential and nonreferential words allowed our model to exclude from the lexicon words that were used without a consistent referent. Second, the ability of the model to infer an empty intention allowed it to discount utterances that did not contain references to any object in the immediate context."



Using the model to explain experimental results

Cross-situational word-learning (Yu & Smith 2007, Smith & Yu 2008)

All models (even the non-intentional ones) successfully learned the word-meaning mappings, given those experimental stimuli.

Doesn't help to differentiate – just shows that all these models can use statistical information like this.

Using the model to explain experimental results

Mutual Exclusivity

"Can you give me the dax?" ("bird" = BIRD already known)





Children give novel object, presumably assuming bird can't also be called "dax".

Intentional model has soft preference for one-to-one mappings already, since having multiple words for object reduces consistency of word use with that object.

(Though note that some of the other comparison models can also show this behavior, such as the conditional probability models.)

Using the model to explain experimental results

Mutual Exclusivity

"Can you give me the dax?" ("bird" = BIRD already known)






Children give novel object, presumably assuming bird can't also be called "dax".

Intentional model scoring for four potential wordreferent mappings. Mapping to novel object is the best.

Note also that this is a case of one-trial learning (Carey 1978, Markson & Bloom 1997).




Using the model to explain experimental results

Object Individuation

Xu 2002: Infants use words to individuate objects

Habituation: toys coming out from behind screens

(figure shows two-word habituation, where words are "duck" and "ball" - alternative is one-word habituation, where both objects would be labeled "tov")



Using the model to explain experimental results

Object Individuation

Xu 2002: Infants use words to individuate objects

Habituation:

"Look, a duck!" "Look, a ball!"

Infant reaction: Infants didn't look as long. (not surprised)

vs.

Habituation: "Look, a toy!" "Look, a toy!"

Infant reaction: Infants looked longer. (surprised to see two objects)

Test: screen removed to reveal...






Using the model to explain experimental results

Object Individuation

Xu 2002: Infants use words to individuate objects

Interpretation: Infants expect words to be used referentially. One object = one label, two objects = two labels.

Intentional model: Simulate looking time with surprisal (negative log probability) and get equivalent results.



Using the model to explain experimental results

Intention Reading

Baldwin 1993: Children sensitive to intentional labeling, not just timing of labeling

Children told the name of a toy that was unseen and given a second toy to play with. Children learned to label the first toy with the name.

Easy to simulate in intentional model: Instead of intended objects being unknown, intended objects are known.

Note: Perceptual salience models cannot capture this.

Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum (2009)

"Our model operates at the "computational theory" level of explanation (Marr, 1982). It describes explicitly the structure of a learner's assumptions in terms of relationships between observed and unobserved variables. Thus, in defining our model, we have made no claims about the nature of the mechanisms that might instantiate these relationships in the human brain."

"The success of our model supports the hypothesis that specialized principles may not be necessary to explain many of the smart inferences that young children are able to make in learning words. Instead, in some cases, a representation of speakers' intentions may suffice."