CHAPTER 5
POLITICAL LEARNING AND
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
|
Learning Objectives: · What are the
major influences in forming the political values of children? · How have the
sources of political learning changed over time? · What special
methods did the German Democratic Republic use to socialize political values;
how successful were these methods? · What are the
major sources of political information today? |
Go to Family Influences
Go to The Educational System
Go to State Actions
Go to Informal Sources of Learning
Go to Mass Media
Go to Suggested Readings
How
do we form our political identities? If stable political systems require that
the citizens hold values consistent with the political process, then one of the
basic functions of a political system is to perpetuate the attitudes linked to
this system. This process of developing the political attitudes and values is
known as political
socialization. (1)
Political
socialization is a life-long process. Learning begins at an early age, long
before people are old enough to participate formally in the political process.
Most children acquire a sense of class, religious, and national identity before
their teens. Early youth is also a time when basic political orientations
develop, when the beliefs anchoring the political culture take root, and when
partisan and ideological tendencies first emerge. This process continues into
adulthood as people develop policy beliefs that reflect their
previously-learned values. New experiences are often viewed through the prism
of previous values. Some elements of the socialization process, such as the
media, also perform a crucial function of communicating between citizens and
political leaders.
The socialization process is especially
significant for Germany. The change in regimes in 1945 and again in 1989 have
twice created the need to reform political values to support the new system.
This chapter examines these experiences, and how contemporary political values
are formed. During the 1950s, the West German government used the schools and
the mass media in a large-scale reeducation campaign to transform the culture
inherited from the Third Reich. As democratic values took root in the West, the
nature of socialization shifted to reinforcing these beliefs and providing the
information that people need to make informed political decisions. The
socialization role of parents changed as they became more supportive of
democratic values. The contemporary media also provide a rich source of
information about politics and a vehicle for political communication.
Western reeducation activities pale, however,
in comparison to the socialization efforts in the East. The GDR government
tried to create a new social and political environment that enveloped the
individual. The government used a variety of "transmission belts,"
such as schools, mass organizations, and the SED itself to educate the public
politically and to reshape social relations. The state was an omni-present force in the East, or so it must have seemed to many of its citizens. Political indoctrination activities
never abated in the East. Perhaps this was an indication of the government's
inability to remake the political culture despite its more extensive
reeducation efforts (see chapter 4). In any case, the collapse of the East and
the integration of its citizens into the Federal Republic renews
the importance of political socialization as an agent of political change.
Political learning in most societies begins
within the family. Parents are usually the major influence in forming the basic
values and attitudes of their children. During their early years children have
few, if any, sources of learning comparable to their parents. Family
discussions can furnish a rich source of political information as parents
provide political role-models for their children. Thus, children often
internalize their parents' attitudes and beliefs. Most parents and children
also share the same cultural, social, and class milieu, providing additional
sources of indirect political cues. For all these reasons, the family normally
has a pervasive effect on the future adult's thoughts and actions.
In post-WWII Germany, the role of the family
was more ambiguous. Researchers linked the traditional authoritarian style of
German family patterns to authoritarian aspects of the political culture. As
Ralf Dahrendorf, for instance, maintained that the
German father furnished a model for the Kaiser or the Führer (or the SED-led
state in the East): (2)
the German father is, or at least used to be, a
combination of judge and state attorney: presiding over his family,
relentlessly prosecuting every sign of deviance, and settling all disputes by
his supreme authority.
This characterization was more
true of the family earlier in the twentieth century, but this pattern of
family relations partially carried over to the postwar period. Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba, for example, found that West
Germans were less likely than either Americans or Britons to say that they
participated in family decision making during their youth. Furthermore, these
nondemocratic family environments affected adult feelings about the democratic
process.(3)
As in many new political systems, the family
often played a limited socialization role in postwar political education. Many
adults did not openly discuss politics because of the depoliticized environment
of the period. In addition, parents were understandably hesitant to discuss
politics with their children for fear of discussing the past. "What did
you do during the Third Reich, father?" was not a pleasant source of
conversation for the parents or their offspring. Furthermore, even if western
parents had wanted to educate their children into the democratic norms of the
Federal Republic, they were ill-prepared to do so because their own democratic
experiences were limited. Most parents in the 1950s had spent the majority of
their adult lives under authoritarian regimes. These experiences served as
examples of what politics should not be, rather than fostering democratic
political values. In other words, adults were learning the new political norms
at almost the same time as their children.
Starting from these uncertain beginnings, the
content and importance of parental socialization in the FRG changed over time.
As people accepted democratic principles and values, the frequency of political
discussion increased. Family conversations about politics are now commonplace.
Moreover, today’s parents were themselves raised under the political system of
the Federal Republic. Helmut Kohl once described them as "the generation
blessed by the grace of late birth." These parents thus can pass on
democratic attitudes that they have held for a lifetime. (4)
Social relations in the family have also
changed. The dominating-father role has largely yielded to a more flexible
authority relationship within the household, especially in middle class
families. Western parents now place more emphasis on teaching their children to
be independent and self-sufficient, rather than obedient. For instance, a 1999
survey comparing East and West found that barely half (56 percent) of
Westerners over 65 thought parents should stress independence in raising their
children, but this increases to 83 percent among 25-34 year olds who are the
parents of today.(5) Younger Germans are now less likely to
be deferential to authority, and more independent–and democratic–in their
political values.
Socialization
patterns in the East followed a different pattern, however. In the postwar
period, families in the East had inherited the same structured family
relationships and hierarchical authority patterns as in the West. Eastern
parents also had lived through the rise and fall of the Third Reich and then
the creation of a new political order. Parents initially were hesitant to talk
about politics, and in any case were themselves learning the new communist
norms of the German Democratic Republic.
Over time the family's role as a socializing
agent also grew in the East. (6) Although the state
bombarded young people with political indoctrination, the family was an
important source of political learning. For example, a 1990 survey of
adolescents in both Germanies found that 62 percent
of Eastern youth frequently discussed politics with their parents, compared to
only 32 percent in the West. (7) Most young people also
claimed to hold the same political opinions as their parents. The personal
closeness of family ties was one reason why parents were an important source of
political cues. In addition, the family was one of the few settings where
people could openly discuss their feelings and beliefs. The family setting
created a private sphere where individuals could be free of the watchful eyes
and ears of the state. Here the state could be praised, but doubts could also
be expressed.
The collapse of the GDR forced many adults to
rethink their political beliefs and past practices. Parents are again learning
the norms and procedures of a new political system at the same time as their
children. For instance, the same 1999 World Values Survey found that Easterners
were more likely than Westerners to express respect for parents and authority
in general. In addition, younger Easterners are less likely than Westerners to
say that parents should stress independence in raising their child, and more
likely to emphasize obedience.(8) These values are changing
among those raised since the fall of the Berlin Wall, but it will take time
because social values in the East fully adopt to the
new social structure.
Because of these changes over time, the ‘generation
gap’ in many political values is greater in Germany than in many other
established Western democracies. Youth in the West are more liberal than their
parents, more positive about their role in the political process, more postmaterialist, and more likely to engage in
unconventional forms political action. (9) Eastern youth are
also a product of their times. The youthful faces of the first refugees exiting
through Hungary in 1989 or at the democracy protests in Leipzig or East Berlin
demonstrated the importance of the youth culture within East Germany. And most
research indicates that Eastern young are more quickly accepting the new social
and political order of the Federal Republic. Like the family in the film Goodbye
Lenin, the older generation has experienced a mid-life change, while the
young are being raised in this new social order.
The
educational system is another important source of political learning. In
contrast to the family, governments can control the content of education and
use it to develop political values–this is typically done when a country
experiences a change in regime. Thus, political leaders in both West and East
saw the educational system as an important tool for developing new political
beliefs, albeit with different goals in mind. The Western Allies and
politicians in the Federal Republic wanted to enlist the schools in their
efforts to reeducate the public to support for the democratic norms of the new
state.(10) The Soviets and East German politicians wanted
to create a "socialist personality" consistent with their new social
and political order.
In the West, the regime expanded the
curriculum to include new courses in civics and more offerings in history.
Instruction aimed at developing a formal commitment to the institutions and
procedures of the Federal Republic. History courses worked to counteract the
nationalistic views promulgated under Weimar and the Third Reich. Social
studies classes stressed the benefits of the democratic system, drawing sharp
contrast to the Communist model. In addition, modern teaching methods
supplanted the authoritarian educational structures and classroom practices of
the past. More participatory forms of education, and even student
‘co-administration” programs, signaled a new set of social norms. These
innovations marked a sharp change from the traditional authoritarian ways of
the German educational system.
YouTube video on
German education system (2:44 min)
Beginning in the mid-1960s, textbooks began
emphasizing an understanding of the dynamics of the democratic system: interest
representation, conflict resolution, minority rights, and the methods of
citizen influence. The model of the passive citizen yielded to a more activist
orientation. Education adopted a more critical perspective on society and
politics. The new texts substituted a more pragmatic view of the strengths and
weaknesses of democracy for the idealistic textbook images of the 1950s. The
system sought to prepare students for their adult roles as political
participants.
The
political impact of formal schooling is typically greatest when prior family
learning is lacking, such as the conditions in postwar West Germany. The
reeducation program helped to develop a stronger sense of political interest
and democratic beliefs among West German youth. In the early 1970s, for
example, West German students ranked highest in support for democratic values
in a 10-nation study of youth.(11) Nevertheless, the
broader social and political trends in society gradually made this program of
formalized political education redundant. Social studies courses now reinforce
democratic political beliefs learned from parents and peers, rather than
creating them in the first place. Thus, the education system in the West now
plays a socialization role that is similar to civics courses in the United
States, Britain, and other established democracies.
The
school system also played a key role in the GDR's program of political
reeducation, although the ultimate political goals and therefore the content of
instruction were much different.(12) The schools attempted
to create a socialist personality that encompassed a devotion to communist
principles, a love of the GDR, a feeling of socialist brotherhood with the
Soviet Union, and participation in the activities of the state. The ideological
content of instruction was more extensive than in the West, and did not
moderate over time. The regime’s principles reached into the curriculum in many
ways. Civics courses stressed Marxist-Leninist principles. Economics courses
stressed the inevitable decline of capitalism and the eventual victory of
socialism. History classes explained the Third Reich as the consequence of
capitalist imperialism and portrayed the Federal Republic as the Nazi’s
successor. The schools stressed the importance of the collective over the
individual. The GDR's constitution stated the government's goal to create:
"a socialist community of well-rounded and harmoniously developed persons
who are inspired with the spirit of socialist patriotism and
internationalism."
Yet the rhetoric of education regularly
conflicted with reality. Paramilitary training was a regular component of the
curriculum and became mandatory for 9th and 10th graders in 1978, but social
science and history texts proclaimed the government's peaceful goals. Educators
forecast the inevitable victory of world socialism, as the gap between Eastern
and Western living standards steadily grew. Given these contradictions, these
education efforts may have had limited effect in reshaping the beliefs of the
young. In part, the educational system was trying to develop values that were
inconsistent with the realities of politics. Many young people certainly
accepted the rhetoric of the regime, but surveys indicate youth's growing
political disaffection during the 1980s.(13)
German unification produced fundamental
changes in the Eastern educational system. (14) Western
experts oversaw a wholesale restructuring of curriculums, and again the
educational system was used to reshape citizen values. Just as foreign language
courses in Russian were replaced with English as a second language, education
in socialist economics gave way to principles of market economies. It was
relatively easy to replace old textbooks with new editions from the West. The
FRG government also replaced thousands of school administrators and university
instructors with new personnel. Gradually, the content of the educational
systems in the East have converged with those of the West.
The Structure of Education
The
educational system is also important in shaping the social structure. Public
education in Germany historically functioned with two contrasting goals. One
goal emphasized personal growth and the development of intellectual creativity
(Bildung) among the top students who
comprise the future leaders of society. Another goal stressed job-oriented
education (Ausbildung) for the masses.
The Federal Republic’s adherence to these two
differing educational models leads to a highly structured and stratified
educational system. Figure 5.1 shows the general structure of the educational
system, although this varies across states because educational policy is a
state responsibility. The social stratification of the educational system most
clear appears at the secondary school level. All students attend a primary
school together for their first four years, and then are divided into one of
three distinct secondary schools tracks. Students in each track attend separate
schools with different facilities, teachers, and curriculums. One track, the
main school or Hauptschule, provides a
general education leading to a working class occupation. This limited formal
schooling ends at age 15 in most Länder, and students then begin a program of vocational training.
About two-fifths of students follow this track.
Figure 5.1. The Structure of Education
The second track is the intermediate school, or Realschule. About a quarter of secondary students
now attend a Realschule. The Realschule
mixes vocational and academic training. For example, students study a second
foreign language and take higher level mathematics. Students graduate from the Realschule at age 16 and receive a completion certificate (Mittlere Reife).
Graduates choose between an apprenticeship or a more
extended period of technical training, perhaps even including study at a
technical college. Most Realschule graduates hold
lower middle-class occupations or work in the skilled trades.
Academic training at a Gymnasium,
an academic high school, is the third track. The Gymnasium is the traditional
route to social and economic success. About 25 percent of secondary school
students in the FRG attend a Gymnasium, a substantial increase from a
generation ago. The curriculum stresses advanced academic topics as preparation
for a university education. After completion of final year exams, the Gymnasium
student receives an Abitur, which confers a
legal right to attend a university.
Nearly all German universities are government
institutions. Once at the university, students follow the traditional Humboltian model of academic learning. For the student this
means the freedom to develop one's intellectual potential largely unfettered by
regulations and formal course requirements. In many social science fields,
students are free to develop their own program of studies. The courses
themselves are often equally unstructured: no quizzes, no finals, no homework,
no required attendance, and no grades. Science programs are usually more
structured, but still relatively open by American standards. The university
system was designed for a small number of strongly self-motivated students,
allowing great freedom to the individual.
This highly stratified system of public
education in the Federal Republic has prompted criticism on several fronts.(15) One persisting criticism highlights the unequal public
spending on the different tracks. Educational spending is concentrated on the
academic track rather than the vocational tracks. The Gymnasiums have lower
student/teacher ratios than the Hauptschulen and Realschulen; and teacher qualifications for the Gymnasium
are more rigorous than for the other tracks. In short, there is an obvious
distinction between education for the masses and education for elites.
The educational system did not create social
inequality within West Germany, but the system tends to perpetuate this
inequality. After only four to six years of primary schooling, students are
directed into one of the three tracks. At this early age, family influences are
still a major factor in the child's development. Most children assigned to the
academic track are from middle-class families, and most students in the
vocational track are from working class families. For instance, if the value
100 represents the average student's chance of attending a Gymnasium, then the
chances for different social classes in 1980 were:
|
Civil
servant’s |
Self-employed’s |
Salaried
employee’s |
Manual
worker’s |
|
396 |
212 |
140 |
21 |
Thus, the child of a government official has
nearly 20 times the chance of attending a Gymnasium as the child of a manual
worker. These social differences are replicated in university enrollments, and
have not greatly lessened over the years. Furthermore, because of the social
and educational gap between secondary school tracks, few students take
advantage of the option to transfer to a higher-level school. The educational
system thus inevitably reinforces class distinctions within society.
Reformers have repeatedly attempted to lessen
the elitist bias of the FRG's educational system. One reform was the creation
of comprehensive schools that include all secondary school students in a single
school with differing curricula. Without a uniform national policy, only half
the state now have comprehensive schools as an
optional fourth track. About a tenth of secondary school students are now
enrolled in comprehensive schools.
Reformers were more successful in other
areas. Several state governments agreed on curriculum reform that narrows the
gap between secondary schools. In these reforms the Hauptschule
curriculum has shifted from the basic, practically oriented, and atheoretical subject matter toward a more specialized set
of course offerings. The curriculum and resources of the Realschule
underwent similar upgrading, contributing to its growing popularity and enrollments.
Another significant reform expanded access to
the universities. In the early 1950s only 6 percent of college-aged youth
attended a university. Today, more than 30 pursue university studies. The
increase partially results from the growth of Gymnasium graduates with the
necessary Abitur to enter the university.
University programs broadened to include new fields of study. Educators also
made a concerted effort to provide alternative educational paths into the
universities for those who did not attend a Gymnasium (although few students
use these alternative paths). The Federal Republic’s university system retains
an elitist emphasis, but its upper class accent is a little less distinct.
Of course, the socialist ideology of the GDR
led to a much different educational structure in the East. By the 1960s,
comprehensive 10-year polytechnical schools were the
core of the educational system.(16) Students from different
social backgrounds, and with different academic abilities, attended the same
school -- much like the public education system in the United States. Those
with special academic abilities could apply for the extended secondary school (Erweiterte Oberschule
[EOS]) during their twelfth year, if they supported socialist political values.
Less than a tenth of the young followed the academic track to university
training.
The contrasting educational structures of the
FRG and GDR illustrate the practical problems posed by German unity. The
unification treaty called for the gradual extension of the Western educational
structure to the East, although several Eastern Länder
have emphasized comprehensive schools at the secondary level. Ironically, the
restructuring of Eastern schools lead to new pressures for liberal reform
within the Federal Republic's educational system.
Although both the FRG and GDR actively tried
to shape the political values of their citizens, the role of each state was
sharply different. With the exception of the school system, the reeducation
efforts in the West largely occurred through indirect mechanisms, relying on an
autonomous media, social groups, and the powers of persuasion. Explicit
political education by the government decreased as the new system took root.
The East German government, in contrast, took a very active and direct role in
the socialization process that even went beyond the factors we have already
discussed. And in contrast to the West, this role remained constant or even
increased over time.
YouTube video on GDR
propaganda film (4:07 min)
A cornerstone of the East German
socialization process was a system of government supervised youth groups. Most children
in primary school were enrolled in a young Pioneer group. The Pioneers combined
the normal social activities that one might find in the Boy Scouts or Girl
Scouts with a basic dose of political education. At age 14, about three-fourths
of the young graduated into membership in the Free German Youth (FDJ) group.(17)The organization stressed
political themes, and participation in a FDJ collective provided the state with
another opportunity to direct the political development of the young and foster
a socialist personality. The FDJ was also a training
and recruiting ground for the future leadership of East Germany, selecting the
brightest and most politically aware for higher positions in the organization
and future membership in the SED.
Another important socialization activities was the Ordination of Youth (Jugendweihe).
This ceremony had developed in Germany as a secular alternative to the
Christian confirmation. The GDR used this ceremony to strengthen the socialist
identity of the young. Each spring, 14-year-olds assembled in public ceremonies
to pledge their commitment to socialist beliefs, brotherhood with the Soviet
Union, and the principles of international socialism. Table 5.1 presents the
four pledges that were the heart of the ceremony, illustrating how political
indoctrination was intermixed with the rites of passage to adulthood. While
West German youth celebrated their coming of age at a birthday party or similar
occasion, East Germans celebrated by pledging their
fraternal loyalties to the Soviet Union. Surprisingly, after the fall of the
GDR this tradition has continued in the East, but now without the heavy
political overtones.
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Table 5.1
The Four Pledges of the East German Youth Ordination · As young
citizens of our German Democratic Republic, are you prepared to work and fit
loyally for the great and honorable goals of socialism, and to honor the
revolutionary inheritance of the people? · As sons and
daughters of the worker-and-peasant state, are you prepared to pursue higher
education, to cultivate your mind, to become a master of your trade, to learn
permanently, and to use your knowledge to pursue our great humanist ideals? · As honorable
members of the socialist community, are you ready to cooperate as comrades,
to respect and support each other, and to always merge the pursuit of your
personal happiness with the happiness of all the people? · As true
patriots, are you ready to deepen the friendship with the Soviet Union, to
strengthen our brotherhood with socialist countries, to struggle in the
spirit of proletarian internationalism, to protect peace and to defend
socialism against every imperialist aggression?
|
Other social spheres mirrored the
socialization activities of the youth groups. At work, individuals participated
in labor collectives, where employment and politics issues were discussed.
Nearly a third of the population belonged to the state-sponsored Society for
German-Soviet Friendship (DSF), and almost a fifth of all women belonged to the
Democratic Women's Federation of Germany (DFD). Such mass organizations
provided the government with other transmission belts to educate the public,
and control social and political norms. Government officials also monitored the
content of mass media, literary magazines, book publishers, and performing artists.
Publications with political themes were subject to especially close scrutiny.
The censorship even went as far as excluding Hansel and Gretel from some
publications of Grimms' Fairy Tales; socialist states
did not recognize the existence of hunger and did not condone disrespect toward
one's elders. The government-approved writers union further regulated those who
would tell a story, write a play, or pen a novel.
The politicization of social life even
extended to sports. The GDR encouraged sports as a way to keep people socially
involved while promoting the value of physical fitness that drew upon the
traditions of the socialist working class movement. In addition, the famous
East German Olympic sports machine provided a source of national pride and became
a basic tool of GDR foreign policy. The government used the medal count at the
summer Olympics as an indicator of the domestic accomplishments and new
international stature of the GDR.
Finally, when persuasion failed the
government relied on its powers of physical control and intimidation. The
infamous Ministry for State Security (Stasi) was in charge of domestic
security. Stasi agents not only collected data on radicals who might pose a
threat to the state, they also were a tool for enforcing compliance with the
regime. The Stasi had its agents in social, economic and political
organizations in order to monitor and control their actions. The Stasi
maintained files on more than 6 million individuals, nearly a third of the
entire population. Several hundred thousand part-time informants provided
information on co-workers or neighbors who engaged in "anti"
behaviors. The expression of political criticism might threaten one's job
security or the ability of one's children to attend university -- or might result
in prosecution by the state. In the wake of German unification, thousands of
Easterners recounted stories of neighbors who were arrested an imprisoned by
the Stasi, children who were unable to attend a university because of their
questionable political record or the records of their parents, and political
dissidents who disappeared into Stasi-run prisons. If East Germans had
internalized the norms of the regime, would such a security apparatus have been
necessary?
|
The Lives
of Others The 2007 movie, The Lives of Others,
tells the story of how the Stasi monitored a group of artists and writers in
the years leading up to the collapse of the GDR. It illustrates the Stasi’s
power under the GDR, and how individuals accommodated themselves to the
state’s power–and how a captain in the Stasi struggled with his role in this
process. Two thumbs up from Ebert and Roeper. It
won the best foreign language film award at the 2007 Oscars. |
These examples show the reality of life in
the GDR. The SED and state institutions directed most aspects of social,
economic, and political life. From a school's selection of texts for first
grade readers to the speeches at a sports awards banquet, the values of the
regime touched everyday life. For those who accepted these values, the
political socialization but the state was unnoticed because it was merely an expression
of values they shared. Despite these extensive efforts, however, the remaking
of the East German culture remained incomplete. This was partially because of
the contradictions between the rhetoric and reality of the regime, and because
Easterners were aware of a different way of life in the West.
Informal
Sources of Political Learning
In any nation, informal personal relations
constitute another important source of political learning. As soon as children
begin to explore the world outside their parents' home, they develop
friendships and peer-group ties that teach them about social (and implicitly
political) relations. Co-workers in the factory are often a valuable source of
information about political matters. Friends discuss politics, compare ideas,
and debate current political issues. Although difficult to measure in a
systematic fashion, these informal contacts constitute a crucial part of the
socialization process.
The 1999 World Values Survey asked about
involvement in such informal networks. The survey found that 59 percent of
Germans said they spend time with their friends on a weekly or more frequent
basis, 28 percent spent time with others in social clubs, 12 percent with
friends from work, and 11 percent with friends from their church. And as might
be expected, the frequency of these social connections was higher among the
young. For example, while only 33 percent of 45-54 year olds spent time with
friends on a weekly basis, 86 percent of those 15-24 spent time with their
friends.
Such peer groups can easily influence the
values of their members. There is much interaction and exposure occurs in the
group, which persists even when the influence of family and schools begins to
wane. Receptivity to the norms of the group is also high, because it is
composed of individuals with strong personal ties and common interests.
Explicit political learning is a minor part
of most youth groups, but under some circumstances the peer group may exert a
substantial impact on political beliefs. For instance, a variety of
biographical studies and impressionistic evidence suggests that the student
movement of the 1960s created a youth subculture in the FRG that socialized a
new political perspective among many university students.(18)
The friendship groups and subculture formed during this period have endured
into adulthood for many activists of the 1960s. In the East, most interaction
with one's peers involved a greater degree of political learning because this
interaction was often structured by membership in the FDJ, youth brigades, or
other officially-sponsored youth associations. Even in the GDR, however, peer
networks revolving around environmental discussion circles or church groups
seemed to nurture those who harbored doubts about the system.
Personal discussions with friends, family,
and political activists can be a meaningful source of political learning. Most
adult friendship networks reinforce previously-formed beliefs, rather than
providing a source for learning new political values. By adulthood most
individuals have developed their basic political values and thus any new
learning must first overcome previous learning. In addition, people generally
select friends with similar social and political values. Nevertheless, the interaction
among friends and co-workers signifies an important source of political
information and an opportunity to discuss political viewpoints. A steelworker
in the Ruhr, for example, hears about politics from his co-workers and other
working-class neighbors and friends. This social milieu provides repeated cues
on which issues are most important to people like oneself, which policies will
provide the most benefit, and which party represents these interests.
Similarly, a Bavarian Catholic learns about political issues at weekly church
services, from Catholic social groups, and from his or her predominately
conservative Catholic friends.
Finally, personal interactions can provide
information that is qualitatively different from newspapers, television, and
other mass media. Face-to-face communication is interactive. People can discuss
information until its meaning is understood; the transfer of information can be
tailored to the recipient. Friendship ties often make personal communication a
more persuasive source of information than impersonal newspaper accounts of the
same events.
Throughout their adult lives, people need
information about current events and new political issues in order to perform
their responsibilities as citizens. The mass media are prime sources of such
information. People often lack direct experience with government and specific
policy outcomes. In many instances, the media provide the only linkage between
citizens and political affairs. Still, the media’s role as a socialization
agent is normally limited. The media less likely than the family, peers, or
school to socialize new political beliefs. Rather, the mass media provide
information that reinforces prior opinions or provides information for
evaluating new events in the context of these opinions.
Germans place a heavy reliance on the media
as a source of political information. Even early studies of the West German
public found that media usage was exceptionally high among the public, a trait
that persists to the present.(19) Similarly, East Germans
had a voracious appetite for the printed word. This section examines how the
contemporary media provide political information to the citizenry.
The Press(20)
Throughout modern German history, the press
has been closely involved in the political process. During the Weimar Republic,
various social and political groups developing their own network of newspapers;
about one quarter of all papers had official or unofficial ties to a political
party. The exploitation of the press reached its worst level under the National
Socialists. The Völkischer Beobachter was the official organ of the National
Socialist movement, substituting nationalism, racism, and anti-liberal
propaganda for factual news. The regime suppressed non-Nazi publications and
eventually forced most to close.
Those charged with overseeing the
redevelopment of the press in the Federal Republic kept this historical legacy
in mind. Immediately after the war, the Allied military forces licensed
newspaper publishers within their respective occupation zones. Only newspapers
and journalists who were free of Nazis ties could obtain a license. The Allies
also tried to encourage political diversity in the media. The Basic Law
(Article 5) ensured that the press would be independent and free of censorship,
and licensing restrictions were removed in late 1949. By then, the overall
structure of the postwar press was established.
This pattern of press development had two
consequences. First, journalists, publishers and the government created a new
journalistic tradition, committed to democracy, objectivity, and political
neutrality. During the early postwar years, the press had an important part in
the political education of the public. Along with radio, newspapers shaped
public images of the new political system and developed an understanding of the
democratic political process. Today, the press is not only responsible for the
dissemination of information, but monitors the actions of government and
educates public opinion. The public and political leaders expect newspapers to
be social and political critics--even if criticism is often unwelcomed. Press
laws grant the media specific legal rights to assist them in this task: the
right of access to government information, the legal confidentiality of
sources, restrictions on libel suits, and limits on government regulation. At
the same time, most newspapers avoid the political propagandizing of the past
by adopting political neutrality and clearly separating factual news from
editorial evaluation.
Second, the postwar pattern of press
development produced a regionalization of newspapers. The licensing of
newspapers within each occupation zone created a network of local and regional
daily papers that continues today. Each region or large city has one or more
newspapers that circulate primarily within that locale. In 2010, there were
over 350 daily newspapers in the Federal Republic, with a combined weekday
circulation of about 25 million. Following unification, the newspapers in the
East were generally integrated into this same framework. Most of the prominent
GDR newspapers were sold to Western buyers, and only a few pursued their own
independence. This produced new regional media centers in Berlin, Leipzig and
other eastern cities. However, newspaper readership and circulation has been
declining over the past two decades, as people find other sources for their
daily news.
The decentralization of the press produces
diversity and pluralism in political commentary, but it also means that the
Federal Republic lacks the common national media environment found in Britain,
France and other European states. In both content and circulation patterns, the
regional press might bear a closer resemblance to American newspapers than to
its German antecedents.
The average citizen has several newspapers
from which to choose. Table 5.2 lists the newspapers with the largest
circulation in 2010. Bild Zeitung has the largest circulation with almost 3
million daily readers. The Bild is the only
truly national paper in the Federal Republic, sold at almost every kiosk and
newspaper stand. However, the Bild and the
other boulevard newspapers offer outlandish stories focusing on criminal
activity, bizarre events, or celebrity lifestyles. A daily diet of such
information can hardly develop a well-informed and sophisticated public.
|
Table 5.2 The Top Ten Daily Newspapers by Circulation in
2010 |
|
|
|
Newspaper group |
Circulation (in ‘000s) |
|
|
Bild-Zeitung |
2,900 |
|
|
Westdeutscher Allgemeine Zeitung |
807 |
|
|
Cologne Group |
515 |
|
|
Süddeutsche Zeitung |
428 |
|
|
Frankfurter Allgemeine |
363 |
|
|
Rheinesche Post |
354 |
|
|
Augsburger Allgemeine |
330 |
|
|
Zeitung Thüringen
|
306 |
|
|
Freie Presse |
283 |
|
|
Nuernberger Nachrichten |
280 |
|
|
Source: World Association of Newspapers, World Press
Trends 2012. |
||
Several "quality" daily newspapers
-- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
Die Welt, Süddeutsche Zeitung, and the Frankfurter Rundschau--
have national reputations because of their sophisticated and detailed news
coverage. Their quality is comparable to the New York Times, Los
Angeles Times, or the Washington Post. These papers are widely
read by political and business elites, and they are available by subscription
or from newsstands throughout the country. Because of their elitist orientation
the circulation figures for the quality press are quite modest.
List of German Newspapers
available online
Several weekly newspapers and news magazines
are also part of the elite press. Die Zeit and
the Welt am Sonntag are national papers that
review the news of the past week and provide an analysis of recent events.
Probably the most influential single publication in the Federal Republic is the
weekly news magazine, Der Spiegel. Its weekly issues combine coverage
of on-going news events with investigative journalism.
Most people read neither the best nor the
worst of the press, but draw their information from their local or regional
newspaper. A citizen of Hamburg reads the Hamburger Abendblatt,
the Volksstimme Magdeburg is
popular in Saxony-Anhalt, a Cologne resident subscribes to the Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger,
Leipzig residents read the Leipziger Volkszeitung, and so forth. In smaller towns the
citizens might subscribe to a small local paper, which devotes more attention
on local news and public interest stories.
Germans
place a high premium on being informed about political matters, and most
citizens rely on newspapers and other printed media as a source of information
on current events. For example, a survey conducted during the 2013 election
found that newspapers were cited as the second most important source of
political information (by 17 percent) and the majority reported regularly
reading a newspaper for information.(21)
The press performs a distinct function in the
process of political learning in Germany (and other established democracies).
Rather than influencing basic value formation, newspapers are a source of
contemporary political information. The media are probably more influential in
determining what people think about, through their choice of news stories, than
in actually influencing what people think. Still, newspaper readership is
related to certain aspects of a participatory political culture. Studies
regularly find that regular newspaper readers are more involved in politics and
more informed about political matters.(22) Reading a
newspaper might not create these orientations, but access to a ready supply of
political information is necessary to sustain this behavior.
Questions often arise over the political
orientation of the press. On the one hand, liberals note that most major
newspapers openly profess impartiality and include such terms as überparteilich or unabhängig
("nonpartisan" or "independent") under the title banner.
Yet, their editorials generally reflect conservative viewpoints. The Frankfurter
Rundschau, Der Spiegel and TAZ
are notable liberal exceptions among a generally conservative press. On the
other hand, conservatives point to evidence that most newspaper journalists
lean toward the SPD. Periodic political criticism of press coverage is probably
an inevitable feature of a free press, and Germany is not exceptional in this
regard. Nevertheless, most of the major national newspapers are known for their
attempt to separate editorial judgement and news
reporting, giving the public access to a diverse and high quality press.
Radio and Television
Germany entered the age of the electronic
media -- radio and television -- during the Weimar Republic. The radio became a
regular part of everyday life in the 1920s and early 1930s. Quickly the radio
became an important source of news and entertainment for the average citizen.
The world's first regular television service began in Berlin in 1935;
television usage grew very slowly, however.
The development of the electronic media
differed in important ways from that of the printed press. Newspapers were
privately owned; radio and television were considered public services. The
Weimar government owned a majority of the shares in the public broadcasting
stations, and a government ministry regulated what went out over the airwaves.
The Third Reich fully exploited the power of this new medium. Hitler
communicated directly with the population via the radio, which magnified his
considerable oratorical skills. The Third Reich's propaganda ministry relied on
radio broadcasts to generate public support for the regime and develop a
national consciousness. The Nazis considered radio's influence so powerful that
receivers built during the war were constructed to receive only German
stations. Listening to foreign radio broadcasts could warrant the death
penalty.
In the Federal Republic, the Western Allies
reestablished a regional radio service within each occupation zone. Radio
broadcasting was a public resource to be controlled by the government. To avoid
the exploitation of the media by a strong national government, as happened
during the Third Reich, the Basic Law made the state governments responsible
for radio and television broadcasting. Control of the first broadcasting
stations passed to the individual Länder governments,
although not every state has its own broadcasting corporation.
There are two public broadcasting
corporations in the Federal Republic. The first channel, ARD, was formed in
1952 as a consortium of the individual state corporations. It includes nine
regional stations in the West, and since 1992 a regional network based in the new
Länder. The second channel, ZDF, is organized as a
single corporation, rather than the consortium arrangement of ARD. All state
corporations also broadcast their own regional programming on a third channel.
|
Deutsche Welle Deutsche Welle is Germany’s international broadcaster. It produces programs for television, radio and the web–in German, English and other languages. It serves as Germany’s voice to the world, similar the Britain’s BBC and the United States’ Voice of America. DW has been broadcasting since 1953 as a public agency. |
Most of the state broadcasting
corporations follow the same organizational principles. A broadcasting
council (Rundfunkrat) sets the general
policy for the corporation and watches over the public interest. In most Länder the broadcasting council consists of representatives
of the Land government, the churches, unions and business organizations,
educational institutions, and other "socially relevant" groups. The
broadcasting council selects the members of a smaller administrative council
that supervises the actual operation of the corporation.
Public control over radio and television has
both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, stations typically
devoted a higher proportion of their programming to public service activities
and cultural events because they are non-profit organizations. During election
periods, the political parties receive a modest amount of free advertising as a
public service (there is no paid political advertising), and extensive airtime
is made available for interviews with party representatives and debates among
party leaders. On the other hand, the quality and variety of programs reflected
its limited funding base and the small number of channels. In the past, one
might see a documentary on truck assembly plants featured during prime time viewing
hours, and the quality of many third channel programs often falls below the
standards of U.S. or British television. Critics also complained about the
broadcasters' paternalistic attitude toward the public, showing what they think
people should watch rather than what the public prefers. More problematic are
questions about the possible bias of government-controlled media. There were
also concerns that the government could use its control of the media to distort
the content of reporting, although such instances have been rare in the Federal
Republic.
Beginning with this public broadcasting base,
technological advances have changed the television environment over the past
few decades. The advent of satellite and cable broadcasting eventually ended
the government's television monopoly. Instead of three networks, most German
households now have access to dozens or hundreds of channels. Technological
progress means that one can eavesdrop on the national television of nearby
states, commercial channels, and a wide range of content. A variety of
pan-European channels have also developed.
The advent of private television does not
mean that the government is willing to relinquish its role in radio and
television. The ARD and ZDF still compete for viewers, and often they are seen
as the preferred information sources for news about politics. Although their
format and content have changed in reaction to competition with the commercial
channels, many of their key features remain. For instance, the nightly news on
both networks remain as mainstays in providing political information, and the
network’s content still reflects a stronger emphasis on education and not just
commercial programming. Despite doubts when commercial media first became
available, it is now clear that Germans have a much richer source of
information available because of these changes. A survey during the 2013
election found that 71 percent of the public claimed that television was their
most important information source on the campaign.(23)
Although television primarily serves as a
source of information on current events, the electronic media have also played
an important role in shaping political attitudes during Germany's two
democratic transitions. During the early postwar years, the FRG used its
control of the mass media to mold public images of the new political system and
develop public support for the democratic process. It was one of the few tools
of public education available to the government, enabling the new democratic
leaders to communicate directly with the citizenry. Research demonstrated a
strong relationship between media usage and political involvement.
Television also played an important role in
the process of German unification and the reshaping of the East German
political culture during the 1980s. Even before unification, West German
television could be seen in about two-thirds of the East. Moreover, when one
traveled through East Germany it was obvious that the TV antennae were pointed
toward the Western stations. Exposure to the Western media showed Easterners
another way of life and another version of history that contradicted the claims
of the East German regime. Life did not look so brutish in the West; the
freedoms of Westerners brought home the restrictions of the SED-state, and
Western living standards illustrated the lagging development of the GDR's
socialist miracle. Western news also reported on political reforms in the
Soviet Union and changes in the rest of Eastern Europe that went unreported in the
official East German press. Through the electronic media, both Germanies were already unified before the Berlin wall fell.
Online Information
While the traditional media sources are still
the dominant sources of political information, the Internet is becoming
increasingly important. People are more and more likely to turn to online news
reporting online versions of the traditional media. Nearly all of the major
newspapers now have an online presence, for example. Between 2006 and 2010
online newspaper readership doubled. In addition, Germans are avid users of
social newtworking sites such as Facebook and Wer-kennt-wen, where information
can flow between friends. Blogging (digitale
Netztagebücher) is also popular among German
youth, just as business websites such as Xing are popular among older Germans.
As of 2014, Germany had one of the highest usage rates of social media in all
of Europe. And when it is election time, voters can turn to a variety of
websites for independent information about the political parties and their
policy positions. Compared to other information sources, the Internet offers
greater variety and greater volume of information--often at the direction and
control of the individual.
The growth of online information also has a distinct
generational component, like most other features of internet usage. For
example, a recent survey found that three-quarters of teenagers visit forums,
newsgroups or chatrooms every week, a much higher precentage than among older citizens. Similarly, only about
7 percent of the overall public mentioned the internet as their most important
source of information during the 2013 elections.(24)
However, the Internet was the most important information source to only 2
percent of people aged 70-79, compared to 28 percent among those under age 30.
Among the under 30 age group, the Internet was only second to television as an
information source. (Newpaper usage runs in the
opposite direction, from only 5 percent citing it as most important among the
under 30 group, to 20 percent among people aged 70-79). Thus the overall
patterns of information should continue to change in the decades ahead.
In summary, all these various media outlets
are important sources of information about political events. Because these
media are treated as public resources, an usually
large share of the programs are devoted to news, political discussions, current
affairs, and other information programs. The public information content of
German television ranks among the highest in Western Europe. Westerners thus
rely on television as a primary source of information, and viewership is even
higher in the East. When surveys ask about the most common sources of information,
television is cited as the most common source of political information: 96
percent say they use television as an information source; newspapers, friends
and colleagues, 87 percent;85 percent; magazines 51 percent; and internet 48
percent.(25) Use of these multiple sources makes for an
informed and aware public.
Conclusion
The past two decades produced important
changes in how the German public learns about politics and how political
leaders communicate with the citizens. Most important, the new citizens in the
East have been integrated into the information network of the Federal Republic.
They moved from a closed system where the GDR government controlled access to
information to an environment where there is a near over-abundance of
information to digest. In addition, the information context has changed in West
and East as a function of technological change, ranging from the spread of
satellite and cable television to the explosive growth of the internet. Today
the average citizen has access to a wider and richer array of information about
politics and society. If the old German saying “Wissen
ist Macht” (knowledge is
power) is correct, then the contemporary democratic citizenry should be very
powerful.
Sterling Fishman and Lothar
Martin, Estranged Twins: Education and Society in the Two Germanys
(New York: Praeger, 1986).
Peter Humphreys, Media and Media Policy
in Germany: the Press and Broadcasting since 1945. New York and Oxford:
Berg Publishers, 1994.
John Rodden, Repainting
the Little Red Schoolhouse: A History of Eastern German Education, 1945-1995.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Meredith Watts, et al. Contemporary
German Youth and Their Elders (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989).
Notes
1. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), chap. 4; David Easton and Jack
Dennis, The Development of Political
Attitudes in Children (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969).
2. Ralf Dahrendorf, Society
and Democracy in Germany (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 139.
3. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba,
The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1963), chap. 12.
4. Also see chapter 4; David Conradt,
"Changing German Political Culture," in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds. The Civic Culture
Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980); Kendall Baker, Russell Dalton and
Kai Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1981).
5. From author’s analysis of the 1999 World Values Survey
in Germany (www.worldvaluessurvey.org);. The percentage of each age
group who say parents should stress independence in raising their children:
|
|
18-24 |
25-34 |
35-44 |
45-54 |
55-64 |
65+ |
|
West |
84 |
83 |
79 |
73 |
67 |
56 |
|
East |
86 |
73 |
68 |
75 |
63 |
57 |
6. Hans Oswald, "Political Socialization in the New
States of Germany." In Miranda Yates and James Jouniss
eds., Roots of Civic Identity: International Perspectives on Community
Service and Activism in Youth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006; Christiane Lemke, "Political Socialization and the 'Micromilieu'" in Marilyn Rueschemeyer
and Christiane Lemke, eds. The
Quality of Life in the German Democratic Republic (New York: M.E. Sharpe,
1989).
7. Deutsches
Jugendinstitut, Deutsche Schüler
im Sommer 1990
(Munich: Deutsches\ Jugendinstitut,
1990).
8. See endnote 5.
9. Meredith Watts, et al. Contemporary German Youth
and Their Elders (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989); Dalton, Citizen
Politics, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013), chap. 5.
10.Brian M. Puaca, Learning Democracy: Education Reform in West
Germany, 1945-1965. Oxford: Berghahn Books,
2009.
11. Judith Torney, A. Oppenheim,
and R. Farnen, Civic Education in Ten Countries,
International Studies in Evaluation, vol. 6. (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1975).
12. Sterling Fishman and Lothar
Martin, Estranged Twins: Education and Society in the Two Germanys
(New York: Praeger, 1986).
13. Friedrich Walter and Hartmut
Griese, Jungend
und Jugendforschung in der DDR (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 199_).
14. Rosalind Pritchard, Reconstructing Education: East
German Schools and Universities after Unification (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999).
15. Max Planck Institute, Between Elite and Mass
Education (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1982).
16. Another distinctive feature of the Eastern educational
system was the extensive network of state-supported day care and kindergarten
facilities that enabled women to work. More than 90 percent of all 3-6
years-olds were in kindergarten; see John Rodden, Repainting
the Little Red Schoolhouse: A History of Eastern German Education, 1945-1995.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
17. John Rodden, Repainting
the Little Red Schoolhouse: A History of Eastern German Education, 1945-1995.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; Krisch, The German Democratic Republic, pp.
153-158.
18. Meredith Watts, et al., Contemporary German Youth
and their Elders (New York: Greenwood, 1989), ch.
3.
19. Almond and Verba, The
Civic Culture, pp. 88089; Holli A. Semetko and Klaus Schoenbach,
"The Campaign in the Media," in Russell Dalton, ed. Germany Votes
1990(Oxford: Berg, 1992).
20. Karl Christian Führer and Corey Ross eds., Mass
Media, Culture and Society in Twentieth-Century Germany.. London: Palgrave Macmillan: Berg
Publishers, 2006.
21. German Longitudinal Election Study, 2013 Election
Survey (http://gles.eu/wordpress/english/).
22. Führer and Ross eds., Mass Media, Culture and
Society in Twentieth-Century Germany.
23. German Longitudinal Election Study, 2013 Election
Survey (http://gles.eu/wordpress/english/).
24. German Longitudinal Election Study, 2013 Election
Survey (http://gles.eu/wordpress/english/).
25. Dalton, Citizen Politics, pg. 23.
copyright 2014
Russell J. Dalton
University of California, Irvine
rdalton@uci.edu
Revised July 3, 2014